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Direct regulation of hedge funds, arguably the most important and 
sophisticated new investment vehicle, with over $2 trillion under 
management,2 is unlikely and infeasible.  The term hedge fund is not 
statutorily defined; however, it “encompasses any pooled investment 
vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional investment 
managers, and not widely available to the public.”3  Hedge funds escape 
the disclosure requirements of every major federal securities law 
because of their elusive organizational structure.4  Determined lobbyists 
 
 1. This Comment is current as of February 2008.  See infra note 92. 
 2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED 
ATTENTION IS NEEDED 1 (2008) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao. 
gov/new.items/d08200.pdf.  The report notes that hedge funds have over $2 trillion in 
management globally with roughly $1.5 trillion managed by U.S. hedge fund advisers. 
 3. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND 
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter PWG 1999 Report], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf. 
 4. See infra Part I.B for a description of how hedge funds escape regulation. 
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have also played a role in ensuring hedge funds are not directly 
regulated.5 
Direct regulation of hedge funds is unlikely namely because it has 
been attempted and failed.  In 2004, responding in part to the collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM),6 a highly leveraged hedge 
fund, the SEC attempted to directly regulate hedge funds by requiring 
hedge fund managers to register, pursuant to the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940.7  However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
struck down the SEC’s new rule, holding that it constituted arbitrary 
rulemaking.8  In addition, many academics have advocated for direct 
 
 5. See Hedge Funds Increase Political Clout via Lobbying, Donations, MONEY 
MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 21, 2007, at 1.  The article states: 
Especially now that the news has leaked that hedge fund managers are raking 
in incredible salaries—some making more than $1 billion a year—Congress is 
undoubtedly going to be taking a serious look at increasing regulation of hedge 
funds, according to a number of reports.  And that has many hedge fund managers 
stepping up their political contributions, hiring lobbyists and, in some cases, 
forming their own political action committees, according to The Economic 
Times. 
Id.; see also Jenny Anderson, Big Money Still Learning to Lobby, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2007, at C1 (noting that three hedge fund lobbying groups exist in Washington, and they 
are all banded by the quest of avoiding restrictive regulation). 
 6. See infra Part I.C.1 for an overview of the LTCM collapse. 
 7. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 72,054, 72,059 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Registration Under Advisers Act] (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-
2333.htm. 
 8. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), where the court held that 
the SEC’s attempt at direct regulation constituted arbitrary rulemaking because the 
regulation exceeded the SEC’s statutory authority.  Id. at 881–84.  The court addressed 
the issue of whether the term client in the Advisers Act included only the funds of the 
investment advisers or the funds’ investors as well.  Id. at 876–79.  Previously, the SEC 
had interpreted the term client to mean the entity, as opposed to the individual clients of 
the entity.  Id. at 876.  In December 2004, amidst strong opposition, the SEC adopted the 
Hedge Fund Rule, which mandated that private funds count the “shareholders, limited 
partners, and beneficiaries of the fund” as “clients.”  Id. at 877; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) 
(2008).  The SEC argued that because the term client was ambiguous and was not 
clarified by the legislative history, it had the regulatory authority to interpret the meaning 
of the term.  See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent at 20–
22, Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873 (No. 04-1434).  The court held that just because the term 
client is not defined in the Advisers Act does not mean the term is ambiguous and can be 
accorded any meaning the SEC chooses.  Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878.  The court further 
noted that the meaning must be gleaned from context and that the legislative history 
clearly indicated Congress’s intent not to regulate hedge fund investment advisers.  Id.  
For an interesting analysis of the Goldstein decision, see generally Recent Cases, 
Administrative Law—Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking—District of Columbia 
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regulation of hedge funds,9 yet the hedge fund industry continues to 
roam wild and free from any meaningful direct regulation. 
Moreover, as former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan 
has also noted, direct hedge fund regulation is also infeasible because 
direct regulation runs the risk of inviting more aggressive funds to 
escape from U.S. regulatory jurisdiction.10  Hedge funds also bring many 
benefits to the economy, such as “increasing liquidity, improving market 
efficiencies and . . . provoking new and more efficient means of managing 
risk and generating returns.”11  Thus, the risk of an exodus of such funds 
caused by direct regulation should not be ignored. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, hedge funds remain important and 
controversial actors in the financial markets.  In 1998, LTCM, a $6 
 
Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge Fund Rule.”—Goldstein 
v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006)., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (2007). 
 9. Some of the many articles advocating some sort of direct hedge fund 
regulation include, but certainly are not limited to Melissa Antoszewski, Comment, Las 
Vegas Style Investing: In the Absence of Regulation, Risky Hedge Fund Bets Can Win 
Big and Lose Even More, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 381, 381 (2007) (calling for 
congressional legislation); Alison S. Fraser, The SEC’s Ineffective Move Toward Greater 
Regulation of Offshore Hedge Funds: The Failure of the Hedge Fund Registration 
Requirement, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 795, 825, 830 (2007) (calling for regulation of 
offshore hedge funds and a reevaluation of the definitions of accredited investor and 
qualified purchaser); Jonathan H. Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar’s 
Poker, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 591, 620 (2001) (suggesting eliminating or capping 
incentive-based fees, limiting leverage, limiting amount of credit provided, mandating 
disclosure, and advocating self-discipline); Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation 
Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 682 (2000) (calling for disclosure of trading positions); 
Joseph Hellrung, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors Are Knocking at the Door, but Can 
the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes in?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317, 345 
(2005) (arguing that the SEC may need a more stringent registration requirement); 
Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register with the SEC, but 
More Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV. 55, 57 
(2006) (arguing for hedge fund registration as well as increased information gathering 
and oversight of registered managers); Jessica Natali, Comment, Trimming the Hedges Is 
a Difficult Task: The SEC’s Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds Falls Short of Expectations, 15 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 113, 115 (2006) (advocating for the SEC to regulate hedge fund 
investments and restrict types of investors permitted to invest in hedge funds). 
 10. See infra Part II.B.1.  Another example of the resistance among key regulators 
toward the idea of directly regulating hedge funds is evidenced by a speech in 2006 by 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.  Bernanke stated that “[t]he primary mechanism 
for regulating excessive leverage and other aspects of risk-taking in a market economy is 
the discipline provided by creditors, counterparties, and investors.”  Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial 
Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 
2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm [hereinafter 
Bernanke May 2006 Speech].  Regulating creditors, counterparties, and investors, of 
course, would indirectly regulate hedge funds. 
 11. Fiona Stewart, Pension Fund Investment in Hedge Funds 8 (Org. for Econ. Co-
operation & Dev., OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 12, 
2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/46/39368369.pdf. 
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billion, highly-leveraged hedge fund, collapsed,12 and concern grew as to 
whether hedge fund collapses may pose broad “difficulties at other 
firms, in other market segments, or in the financial system as a whole.”13  
Thus, after LTCM, the public became aware of the broad economic 
impact a hedge fund collapse could pose.14  The controversy and importance 
of hedge funds resurfaced in 2007 when several other leveraged funds 
imploded, triggered by their deep exposure to the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market.15 
Another major issue that underscores the controversy and importance 
of hedge funds is that pension funds, the largest institutional investors, 
which invest retirees’ money, are increasingly investing those assets in 
hedge funds to boost returns.16  The number of U.S. corporate defined-
benefit pension funds investing in hedge funds has been increasing 
throughout the last several years, and the percentage is expected to 
continue increasing.17  This could be a dangerous trend considering some 
 
 12. FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 
262–63 (1999).  LTCM “leveraged a few billion dollars into $1.25 trillion of derivatives 
bets.”  Id. at 262. 
 13. GAO Report, supra note 2, at 2.  “For example, hedge funds may impose 
losses on their creditors and counterparties and thereby disrupt the credit availability to 
financial markets or through market disruptions that could accompany liquidation of 
funds’ positions.”  Id. 
 14. Id. (noting that, in the case of LTCM, poor market discipline is often cited as a 
factor contributing to the demise of the fund). 
 15. See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  In brief, the subprime mortgage 
collapse is the outcome of an increasing amount of foreclosures on subprime loans.  See 
Chris Isidore, Subprime Woes: How Far, How Wide?, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 5, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/05/news/economy/subprime/index.htm.  The implosion of 
hedge funds triggered by their exposure to the subprime market is also referred to as “the 
great unwind.”  The Great Unwind, FIN. TIMES.COM, Aug. 10, 2007, http://www.ft. 
com/cms/s/2/d709a4e4-471b-11dc-9096-0000779fd2ac.htm; see also Jon Markman, Are 
We Headed for an Epic Bear Market?, MSN MONEY, Sept. 20, 2007, http://articles. 
moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/SuperModels/AreWeHeadedForAnEpicBearMarket.as
px (stating that many subprime loans were “invented so that hedge funds would have 
high-yield debt to buy”). 
 16. Riva D. Atlas & Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Officers Putting Billions into 
Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at A1.  Note that institutional investors also 
include endowments, insurance companies, and foundations, as well as pension plans.  
SUSAN M. MANGIERO, RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PENSIONS, ENDOWMENTS, AND 
FOUNDATIONS 7 (2005).  Hedge fund investors also include high net worth individuals.  
PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 1. 
 17. See WILLIAM KLUNK, PENSION FUNDS INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS 2 (Cong. 
Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS 22679, June 15, 2007), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22679_20070615.pdf; Atlas & Walsh, 
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pension funds have lost substantial amounts of retirees’ money by 
investing in hedge funds, such as the San Diego County Retirement fund, 
which lost $100 million after Amaranth Advisers collapsed in 2006.18  
Consultants and academics question “whether hedge funds, with risks 
that are hard to measure, are appropriate for pension funds, whose sole 
purpose, by law, is to pay out predetermined benefits to retired workers.”19  
Thus, the pension fund-hedge fund affair provides yet another reason to 
question why the status quo should be maintained, particularly given the 
increasing controversy and importance of hedge funds, and the recognition 
that direct regulation is unlikely and infeasible. 
The foregoing analysis can be summarized into three major points: 
(1) LTCM’s collapse, the subprime mortgage crisis and ensuing hedge 
fund implosions, and the quandary of pension funds investing in hedge 
funds highlight the important and controversial nature of hedge funds; 
(2) it is evident from LTCM’s collapse and the subprime mortgage crisis 
that the restraints of the free market failed to impose adequate market 
discipline on hedge fund market participants; and (3) because direct 
regulation of hedge funds is unlikely and infeasible, other measures need 
to be taken to ensure that adequate market discipline exists.  This 
Comment puts forth the case for indirect hedge fund regulation, which 
places the regulatory focus on market participants,20 and essentially 
mandates best risk management practices.  This approach will preserve 
the benefits hedge funds provide to U.S. capital markets and still minimize 
the potential for systemic risk.21 
 
supra note 16; see also Jonathan Peterson, Rest Later; Check Pension Plan Now, L.A. 
TIMES, May 13, 2007, at C1. 
 18. Peterson, supra note 17; see also Jenny Strasburg, Failed Hedge Fund Firm Is 
Sued for Fraud in U.S., INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 2, 2007, at 14, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/01/bloomberg/bxfund.php. 
 19. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16.  See generally MANGIERO, supra note 16. 
 20. Hedge funds’ market participants include investors, creditors, and counterparties 
such as prime brokers. 
 21. Other regulatory approaches would have a far more restrictive impact on hedge 
funds.  For example, regulators in other countries have implemented outright bans on pension 
fund investment in hedge funds.  Stewart, supra note 11.  An outright ban on pension 
fund investment in hedge funds would have a devastating impact on the ability of hedge 
funds to continue to operate.  This Comment’s proposal, however, simply seeks to lightly 
regulate the key players while stabilizing the financial markets.  For a discussion of other 
potential regulatory schemes, see id.  Systemic risk refers to the “potential that a single 
event, such as a financial institution’s loss or failure, may trigger broad dislocation or a 
series of defaults that affect the financial system so significantly that the real economy 
is adversely affected.”  Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk: Perspectives of the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial 
Servs., 110th Cong. 63 (2007) [hereinafter Testimony of Steel] (testimony of Robert K. 
Steel, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, United States Department of the Treasury), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp486.htm.  Given the complexity of 
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Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of hedge funds, 
describe the failure of direct regulation of hedge funds, and analyze the 
failure of free market restraints.  Part II will discuss the theory of indirect 
regulation, compare and contrast it to direct hedge fund regulation, and 
apply the theory of indirect regulation to hedge funds.  Part III will 
discuss the mechanics of the proposed indirect regulatory scheme which 
places the regulatory focus on market participants.  This Part will also 
explain how pension funds fit into an indirect framework and then offer 
an international solution to the task of uniformly regulating hedge fund 
creditors.  This Comment will continue by analyzing the disclosures 
needed by market participants and how these disclosures should be 
provided.  Finally, this Comment will conclude by demonstrating that this 
proposal will not drive hedge funds out of the United States and will 
therefore provide a practical way of ensuring market discipline.22 
 
the financial markets, systemic risk will never be eliminated.  One hedge fund manager 
commented on systemic risk and stated: 
You don’t deliberately obliterate hundreds of billions of dollars of investor 
money. . . .  [I]t [referring to LTCM and other market crises] is going to happen 
again.  The financial markets that we have constructed are now so complex, and the 
speed of transactions so fast, that apparently isolated actions and even minor 
events can have catastrophic consequences. 
RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 1 (2007). 
 22. The following is a brief summary of the key proposals of this Comment: First, 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) should be amended to state that 
any private pension fund that seeks to invest money into a hedge fund may only do so if 
that hedge fund discloses certain material information and is registered with the SEC.  
Second, Congress should enact new legislation that would allow hedge funds to 
voluntarily register with the SEC as hedge funds, to provide an avenue for hedge funds 
to, at a minimum, furnish the SEC with audited financials, follow SEC rules in calculating the 
value of their assets, and disclose their trading strategies in confidence.  Because hedge 
funds are not yet statutorily defined, this can be done by simply using the commonly accepted 
definitions and standards to designate a fund as a hedge fund, as described supra p. 990.  
Third, an international regulatory solution is necessary to address the arduous task 
of uniformly regulating hedge fund creditors.  This could be done through the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), an international organization which serves as a bank for 
central banks, which, in its capacity as a forum to promote discussion and policy among 
central banks, should establish international banking standards with hedge funds.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 230–34.  These standards should include mandating that 
all banks engaging in hedge fund financing should only do so if the hedge funds provide 
them with audited financials, follow SEC or other accepted rules in calculating the value 
of their assets, and disclose their trading strategies in confidence. 
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I.  HEDGE FUNDS, DIRECT REGULATION, AND                                                
MARKET IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Hedge Fund Basics 
Although the first hedge fund was started in 1949,23 during the last 
twenty years, the hedge fund industry has grown exponentially.24  With 
over $2 trillion under management,25 although large in size when compared 
to other sectors of the financial market, hedge funds are actually relatively 
small.26  Nonetheless, some experts believe that hedge funds account for 
approximately fifty percent of all U.S. trading volume.27  Hedge funds 
are also known for their abusive use of leverage.28  Many regulations 
 
 23. PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. GAO Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
 26. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2007 (Dec. 6, 2007) 
(presenting statistics of total financial assets: $8 trillion in mutual funds, at 77; $10.9 
trillion in commercial banks, at 69; $5 trillion in life insurance companies, at 75; $5.9 
trillion in private pension funds, at 75; $1.4 trillion in property and casualty insurance 
companies, at 74; and $3.2 trillion in state and local employee retirement funds, at 76), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20071206/z1.pdf. 
 27. Testimony of Steel, supra note 21, at 62.  In addition, see also GAO Report, 
supra note 2, stating: 
Hedge funds are key players in many financial markets.  For example, hedge 
funds reportedly account for more than 40 percent of the trading volume in the 
U.S. leveraged loan market, more than 85 percent of the distressed debt 
market, and more than 80 percent of certain credit derivatives markets.  
Institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations, insurance companies, 
and pension plans, seeking to diversify their risks and increase returns, have 
invested in hedge funds and contributed to the rapid growth in these funds. 
Id. at 1. 
 28. Leverage refers to the use of various forms of credit extensions to augment 
returns.  Press Release, Testimony of Randal K. Quarles, Under Sec’y for Domestic Fin., 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs (July 25, 2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp24.htm.  
Examples include repurchase agreements, short positions, derivative contracts, loans, 
and margin, to name a few.  Id.  Increasing leverage necessarily increases risk.  Id.  In its 
report after the LTCM failure, the PWG noted that excessive leverage can significantly 
amplify the negative effects of market conditions.  Id.  Moreover: 
Linked closely with the issue of leverage and the potential for impaired 
liquidity in a period of market stress is the issue of concentration of market 
positions or ‘crowded trades.’  Sometimes referred to as ‘herding,’ crowded 
trades can arise to the extent that hedge fund managers are inclined to pursue 
the same or similar investment strategies.  If numerous market participants 
establish large positions on the same side of a trade, especially in combination 
with a high degree of leverage, this concentration can contribute to a liquidity 
crisis if market conditions compel traders simultaneously to seek to unwind 
their positions.  The risk, of course, is market disruption and illiquidity, possibly 
exacerbating the risk of a systemic financial market crisis. 
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that apply to registered investment companies, such as mutual funds, do 
not apply to hedge funds.  Examples include: liquidity requirements; 
redemption requirements; disclosure requirements of fees, holdings, and 
performance; and limitations on the use of leverage.29 
Additionally, hedge fund fees are performance-based and hedge funds 
typically employ short-term investment strategies, whereas mutual fund 
fees are not performance-based and usually do not engage in short-term 
investment strategies.30  Different hedge funds employ very different trading 
strategies and investment styles, some quantitative, some subjective.31  
Similarly, different hedge funds trade very different types of financial 
instruments, ranging from long or short positions in equity or fixed income 
securities to exchange traded futures, over-the-counter derivatives, 
and foreign exchange markets.32 
B.  The Failure of Direct Regulation of Hedge Funds 
This section will explain two major federal securities laws that fail to 
regulate hedge funds, discuss how the funds are designed to evade their 
regulatory reach, and examine the SEC’s attempt to regulate them under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
 
Id.; see also PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that hedge funds are often 
responsible for disruptive movements in markets, particularly in vulnerable economies).  
Furthermore, see Richard Beales, Wary Credit Market Awaits Hedge Funds’ Longer 
Term Impact, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 2005, at 40: 
One [concern] is about the leverage employed by hedge funds.  If a fund lost 
money, and at the same time was forced, perhaps by its prime broker, to reduce 
leverage, it could be forced to sell assets quickly, magnifying any shock.  If 
that happened to even a few large funds, the impact on the financial system 
could be widespread . . . . 
Id. 
 29. Adam R. Bolter, Comment, Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers: A Valid 
Exercise of Rulemaking Authority or the Promulgation of New Law?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 
595, 599 n.17 (2005). 
 30. See PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 2; Bolter, supra note 29, at 599.  In 
other words, hedge fund managers have a greater incentive to take on risk for short term 
gains. 
 31. PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
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1.  The Investment Company Act 
The Investment Company Act limits transactions with “affiliated 
persons,”33 requires funds to maintain ample liquidity,34 regulates 
corporate governance of the funds,35 and sets forth rules for pricing of 
the funds’ portfolios.36  A key distinction between investments obligated 
to register under the Investment Company Act and those that are free 
from the registration requirements is the restrictive limits on borrowing 
that apply to registered companies.37  Therefore, in order to employ the 
leverage for which hedge funds are known, they are structured to avoid 
registering as investment companies. 
There are three components to the definition of an “investment 
company,” all of which must be met in order for registration to be required 
under the Investment Company Act.38  There is “an operating component,”39 
“a manner of offering component,”40 and “an investor component.”41  
Hedge funds cannot avoid the operating component of the definition 
because they are primarily in the business of “investing, reinvesting, or 
trading in securities,” as defined in the Act.42  However, hedge funds 
do fall under exceptions to the other two components of the definition.  
With respect to the manner of offering component, hedge funds offer 
their securities in private, rather than public, offerings.  Therefore, hedge 
funds do not meet the manner of offering definition, and so they are 
exempt from regulation under the Investment Company Act.43  With 
respect to the investor component, hedge funds either limit the number 
of beneficial owners of their shares to one hundred or limit their investors to 
qualified purchasers who, as individual investors, own at least $5 million 
in investments.44  They are therefore able to escape registering as investment 
companies. 
 
 33. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–9, –10, –12, –17 (2006). 
 34. Id. § 80a–22. 
 35. Id. § 80a–16. 
 36. Id. § 80a–22.  Another major feature of the Investment Company Act is its 
view of debt.  Id. § 80a–1(b).  Section 1 of the Investment Company Act emphasizes that 
the national interest is harmed when investment companies borrow excessively and 
increase the speculative nature of their junior securities.  Id. 
 37. Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 324, ¶ 19 (2007), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=654&print=true. 
 38. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a. 
 39. Id. § 80a–3(a)(1)(A). 
 40. Id. § 80a–3(c). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 80a–3(a)(1)(A). 
 43. Id. § 80a–3(c)(1), –3(c)(7). 
 44. Id. 
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2.  The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) requires anyone 
“who, for compensation, gives investment advice as to the purchase and 
sale of securities” and manages over $30 million in assets to register as 
an investment adviser.45  Section 204(b)(3) of the Advisers Act creates 
an exception on which almost every hedge fund relies—this section 
exempts any investment adviser with fewer than fifteen “clients.”46  The 
entire hedge fund is considered one client,47 and thus the rule would only 
prohibit a fund manager from managing more than fifteen funds.  A 
regulation that would alter this counting method was struck down in 
Goldstein v. SEC.48 
a.  Goldstein v. SEC 
Responding in part to the LTCM fallout, the SEC promulgated a new 
regulation in 2004 that required hedge fund managers to register pursuant to 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.49  The SEC’s regulation would 
have changed the way an investment adviser would count “clients.”50  
Hedge fund managers who previously were not required to register 
because they had fewer than fifteen clients would be required by the 
SEC to count each investor in a hedge fund, as opposed to the fund 
itself, as a client for purposes of meeting the fewer than fifteen client 
rule.51  The District of Columbia Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC, however, 
rejected the adjustment to the client counting rule, holding that it 
constituted arbitrary rulemaking by the SEC.52 
 
 45. Id. § 80b–2(a)(11). 
 46. Id. § 80b–3(b)(3). 
 47. Ian D. Prior, An Opportunity Lost: The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s New Rule Requiring Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Has an Achilles 
Heel—and Hedge Funds Will Take Advantage, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 471, 
477 (2006). 
 48. 451 F.3d 873, 883–84 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 49. Registration Under Advisers Act, supra note 7. 
 50. Ordower, supra note 37, ¶ 7. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 451 F.3d at 884; see supra note 8 (explaining the Court’s rationale).  It is 
worth noting that some hedge fund advisers, although not required to, still register with 
the SEC as investment advisers.  The GAO January 2008 Report on hedge funds noted 
that the “SEC regulates an estimated [1991] hedge fund advisers that are registered as 
investment advisers, which include [forty-nine] of the largest U.S. hedge fund advisers 
that account for about one-third of hedge funds’ assets under management in the United 
States.”  GAO Report, supra note 2, at 5.  One reason for this could be because “[i]nvestors, 
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The SEC never appealed the ruling, although shortly thereafter, it 
adopted rule 206(4)-8 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which 
provides the SEC with the ability to bring SEC enforcement actions 
against hedge funds or pooled investment vehicles.53  This new rule “is 
designed to clarify, in light of a recent court opinion [Goldstein], the 
Commission’s ability to bring enforcement actions under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 against investment advisers who defraud investors 
or prospective investors in a hedge fund or other pooled investment 
vehicle.”54  Thus, the SEC is still closely monitoring hedge funds, 
even though the funds are not required to register, as would have been 
mandated by the now invalidated rule.55  This current rule allows the SEC 
to bring enforcement actions, although it does not require registration 
and disclosure by hedge funds, nor does it provide a private right of 
action.56 
C.  The Failure of the Free Market 
This section will discuss market failures such as Long Term Capital 
Management’s collapse and the subprime mortgage meltdown—two 
events that made hedge funds famous for their risky bets and ability to 
have a serious impact on the economy at large.  It will also discuss how 
hedge funds are making their way into average investors’ portfolios and 
highlight the increase in fraud within the hedge fund industry. 
1.  Long Term Capital Management 
In 1994, John Meriwether founded Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), a prestigious hedge fund that employed various complex trading 
strategies.57  LTCM’s team was made up of some of the most highly 
regarded financial experts in the world, including Merton and Scholes, 
 
creditors, and counterparties impose market discipline on hedge funds by providing more 
funding or better terms to those hedge funds willing to disclose credible information 
about the fund’s risks and prospective returns.”  Id. at 6. 
 53. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,758 (Aug. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Prohibition] (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 275), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/ia-2628.pdf. 
 54. Id. at 44,756. 
 55. Also note that hedge funds are still subject to some regulatory reporting 
requirements.  As the GAO’s January 2008 Report on hedge funds noted, for example, 
“upon acquiring a [five] percent beneficial ownership position of a particular publicly 
traded security, a hedge fund may be required to file a report disclosing its holdings with 
SEC.”  GAO Report, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
 56. Prohibition, supra note 53. 
 57. See PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 10; FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: 
HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 251 (2003). 
JONNA.PRINTER.DOC 11/25/2008  2:00:33 PM 
[VOL. 45:  989, 2008]  In Search of Market Discipline 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1001 
who together won the 1997 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences for their research in options theory.58  LTCM was highly leveraged, 
which made it extremely vulnerable to the market movements that followed 
the fall of the Russian ruble.59  Concern grew within the financial markets 
about the effect of an LTCM collapse on the then fragile world markets.60  
The situation escalated to the extent that in 1999, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York intervened and arranged a consortium of fourteen 
firms to effectively bail out the dying fund.61  LTCM “lost nearly all of 
its investors’ money in a period of weeks . . . [and] many investors did 
not realize the extent of their exposure to particular risks.”62  LTCM’s 
collapse demonstrated the failure of the free market’s ability to restrain 
hedge funds and maintain market discipline.63 
2.  The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown and Ensuing                                   
Hedge Fund Implosions 
In 2007, the subprime mortgage market collapsed.  In brief, the subprime 
mortgage collapse is the outcome of an increasing amount of foreclosures 
on subprime loans.64  These subprime loans—loans to borrowers with 
poor credit—were packaged into securities called Collateralized Debt 
 
 58. See PARTNOY, supra note 57, at 252. 
 59. PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 60. Id. at 12–13. 
 61. Id. at 13.  To understand how one hedge fund can pose such a sweeping risk to 
the economy, see BOOKSTABER, supra note 21.  Bookstaber described the LTCM situation as: 
[S]tart[ing] with a relatively minor loss for the hedge fund, a loss that required 
LTCM to liquidate positions to meet demands for margin.  A simple exercise 
in raising cash through a security sale generated a downward cascade when the 
liquidated securities sucked prices down, causing the overall portfolio to lose 
value.  The drop in the portfolio elicited further demands for cash to cover declining 
positions.  These in turn precipitated further liquidations.  The market reacted 
more to each wave of selling, and the next cycle of demands of the creditor 
banks then followed immediately.  The crisis came to an end unnaturally, when 
the Federal Reserve strong-armed the creditor banks to break the cycle, 
effectively unlinking the tight coupling. 
Id. at 145.  For a more detailed explanation of the LTCM collapse, see PARTNOY, supra 
note 57, at 251–66. 
 62. PARTNOY, supra note 57, at 228–29. 
 63. See PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 30 (explaining how market discipline 
broke down in the case of LTCM). 
 64. See Isidore, supra note 15. 
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Obligations (CDOs) and sold to individual and institutional investors, 
including hedge funds.65 
It is believed that many of these subprime loans were “invented so that 
hedge funds would have high-yield debt to buy.”66  A June 2007 New 
York Times editorial stated that “Wall Street—abetted by lax federal 
regulation—is largely to blame for this fiasco.  Wall Street firms 
encouraged the issuance of risky loans to troubled borrowers and then 
reaped a financial windfall by packaging them as investments to hedge 
fund clients.”67  Some experts believe that more blame should be placed 
on hedge funds for betting so heavily on these CDOs rather than on the 
bad subprime loans themselves.68  It has been noted that the market for 
CDOs would not have existed without “[w]illing investors who stood 
ready to buy the repackaged subprime debt.  There was no shortage of 
buyers because these instruments offered a tempting higher yield.”69 
Several hedge funds have collapsed as a result of placing heavy bets 
on CDOs, including two large hedge funds operated by the investment 
bank and trading firm, Bear Stearns.70  The two Bear Stearns hedge funds 
had bet on CDOs and lost approximately $1.5 billion of investors’ money 
when the subprime loans which comprised the CDOs were discovered to 
be virtually worthless.71  These Bear Stearns hedge funds were also highly 
leveraged, which magnified the losses.72 
 
 65. See David Henry, This Investment Could Turn Ugly, BUS. WK., June 18, 2007, 
at 68. 
 66. Markman, supra note 15. 
 67. Editorial, Housing and Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at A20 
[hereinafter Housing & Hedge Funds].  The article also commented that lenders, banks, 
and hedge funds should not be permitted to “risk everyone’s economic well-being in 
their attempts to enrich the few.”  Id. 
 68. Peter Morici, It’s the Hedge Funds, Stupid; Fed and European Central Bank 
Must Calmly Reassure Beleaguered Markets, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 
2007, at A12. 
 69. Michael Brush, Who’s to Blame for the Mortgage Mess?, MSN MONEY, Nov. 
15, 2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/CompanyFocus/WhosToBlame 
ForTheMortgageMess.aspx. 
 70. See Mark Pittman, Bear Stearns Fund Collapse Sends Shock Through CDOs 
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, June 21, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=ahWfhEJ7dra4. 
 71. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth 
Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C2. 
 72. See Housing & Hedge Funds, supra note 67, stating: “The Bear Stearns funds, 
like many others, borrowed big to invest in subprime loans.  Investing with borrowed 
money juices returns in hot markets and magnifies losses in down markets, making losers out 
of lenders as well as equity investors.”  The Bear Stearns hedge funds managers were 
later indicted for fraud.  Patricia Hurtado & Thom Weidlich, Ex-Bear Stearns Fund Managers 
Indicted for Fraud (Update 4), BLOOMBERG.COM, June 19, 2008, http://www. bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=as3ef9aE2W_8.  For a brief discussion of 
the Bear Stearns bailout which ensued, see Elliot Blair Smith, Bear Stearns Rescue Is ‘Finger 
JONNA.PRINTER.DOC 11/25/2008  2:00:33 PM 
[VOL. 45:  989, 2008]  In Search of Market Discipline 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1003 
A study in 2005 noted a trend in the credit derivatives market73 of 
“increased participation by hedge funds and other leveraged counterparties 
as sellers of credit protection.”74  The study noted that hedge fund participation 
“may marginally increase counterparty credit risk due to some hedge 
funds’ leveraged nature.”75  Much has been learned since 2005—it is arguable 
that the abovementioned statement significantly understates the risk that 
hedge funds have brought to the credit derivatives market. 
A crisis such as the subprime mortgage debacle brings about broad 
adverse effects that trickle down into the wallet of everyday consumers, 
even those who have no direct exposure to any subprime loan or related 
financial derivative.76  In addition to the expected rise in foreclosures 
and the subsequent impact on housing values generally,77 experts have 
also noted that credit card policies and auto loans have become more 
restrictive and less beneficial to consumers in response to the losses 
 
in Dike,’ Scholars Say (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid= acAqXkb6aIJM. 
 73. A CDO is a type of credit derivative.  See Bartly Dzivi, Viewpoint: Another 
Depression?, ORIGINATION NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, at 4, for a discussion of the role hedge 
funds and credit derivatives have played in the subprime mortgage collapse.  The author 
stated: 
Warren Buffett has a succinct view of financial derivatives: they are a time 
bomb for those who trade them, and for the economy as a whole.  In 2003, Mr. 
Buffett said, “Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) 
on ‘earnings’ calculated by mark-to-market accounting.  But often there is no 
real market . . . and ‘mark-to-model’ is utilized.  This substitution can bring on 
large-scale mischief. . . . In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into 
what I would call mark-to-myth.” 
Id. at 4. 
 74. COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 110 (2005) [hereinafter Report of CRMPG 
II], available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-II.pdf.  A counterparty is 
simply someone who is a party to a contract (or financial transaction).  A DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE AND BANKING 95 (John Smullen & Nicholas Hand eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
 75. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at 110. 
 76. See Jim Jubak, Credit Contagion Infects Your Wallet, MSN MONEY, Oct. 26, 2007, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/JubaksJournal/CreditContagionInfectsYo
urWallet.aspx.  The article discusses how the subprime crisis has spread to car loans and 
credit cards.  Id.  Jubak cites many changes in credit card policies that have hurt consumers, 
such as higher monthly interest rates, higher penalty rates, late fees, over limit fees, 
shorter grace periods, and lower credit limits.  Id.  Jubak believes these policies were 
implemented to “pull in more revenue from cardholders to offset the squeeze on their 
profits.”  Id. 
 77. See John W. Schoen, Foreclosures Jump 30 Percent in 3rd Quarter, MSNBC 
BUS., Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21551909/ (reporting that foreclosures in 
the third quarter of 2007 had risen thirty percent from the second quarter of 2007, and 
double from the third quarter of 2006). 
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many banks have recently suffered.78  Consumer confidence has been 
falling throughout the second half of 2007 and into the start of 2008, 
partly as a result of the concerns people have due to the credit crunch.79  
Moreover, worries about subprime mortgage losses have resulted in 
much volatility and many tough days for the stock market.80  In addition, 
“[t]he credit crunch that rattled mortgage lenders has spread to the education 
lending market, with dramatic results.”81  This demonstrates the extent 
of the damage to the economy that this financial crisis, arguably driven 
by the hedge fund industry, is beginning to cause. 
Analysts predict that “worldwide losses from bad subprime-mortgage 
loans will reach as much as $400 billion.”82  Market strategists’ expectations 
for a recession in 2008 have increased significantly as a result.83  In late 
2007, Merrill Lynch wrote off billions of dollars and forced the retirement 
of their seasoned CEO due to the risky bets he placed on CDOs.84  
E*Trade’s stock price fell by about fifty-eight percent in a single day of 
trading in November 2007—from $8.59 per share to around $3.55 per 
 
 78. See Jubak, supra note 76. 
 79. Associated Press, Consumer Confidence Falls to Two-Year Low, MSNBC 
BUS., Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21543609/. 
 80. Charley Blaine & Elizabeth Strott, Dow Falls 362 on Citigroup, Financial 
Weakness, MSN MONEY, Nov. 2, 2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/ 
Dispatch/071101markets.aspx (reporting that the Dow fell 362 points “on weakness in 
financial stocks, especially Citigroup”); see also Charley Blaine & Elizabeth Strott, Dow 
Falls 121 as Fear Slams Financial Stocks, MSN MONEY, Nov. 15, 2007, http://articles. 
moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Dispatch/071115markets.aspx (reporting a 121 point 
drop in the Dow due to the “fear of the unknown in financial stocks”); Charley Blaine & 
Elizabeth Strott, Dow Falls 237; Citigroup Gets a Partner, MSN MONEY, Nov. 27, 
2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Dispatch/ 071126markets.aspx 
(reporting that the Dow fell more than 237 points as credit fears escalated).  Also 
noteworthy is that the recent increase in foreclosures has even led to an increase in crime 
in states such as Atlanta.  This increase in crime is even affecting suburban and moderate 
income areas because many homeowners have no choice but to accept any renter they 
can find, bringing bad renters to the areas and planting the seeds of crime in otherwise 
safe areas.  See Associated Press, Squalor, Crime Follow Wave of Foreclosures, MSNBC 
BUS., Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21773482/ (noting an increase 
in prostitution and drug activity and citing a study that states that a one percent increase 
in the foreclosure rate increases neighborhood violent crime by 2.33%); Charley Blaine 
& Elizabeth Strott, Citi’s Big Loss, Weak Retail Sales Batter Stocks, MSN MONEY, Jan. 
15, 2008, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Dispatch/080115markets.aspx (stating 
that the Dow fell 277 points as Citigroup wrote off billions). 
 81. Liz Pulliam Weston, The Coming Student Loan Crunch, MSN MONEY, Feb. 
21, 2008, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/CollegeAndFamily/CutCollegeCosts/The 
ComingStudentLoanCrunch.aspx. 
 82. Brush, supra note 69. 
 83. Id. 
 84. NPR Reports & Associated Press, Embattled Merrill Lynch CEO O’Neal Steps 
Down, NPR, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15768986. 
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share—after the company stated that it could not predict new credit 
losses, and analysts discussed the possibility of bankruptcy.85 
Yet, one hedge fund manager made hundreds of millions of dollars 
betting against the mortgage industry.86  He has commented that “we’re 
headed into a deep recession, the worst since the Depression, as dozens 
of banks will fail.”87  The role hedge funds have played in the demand 
for CDOs is troubling and the problem is only compounded by the fact 
that some hedge funds are actually benefiting from the ensuing CDO 
losses their industry helped to create.88 
Thus, the current market failures of the subprime mortgage crisis have 
been driven in large part by a hedge fund industry free from meaningful 
oversight,89 hedge funds’ excessive use of leverage, and an overall lack 
 
 85. Ben Steverman, E*Trade’s Meltdown, BUS. WK., Nov. 12, 2007, http://www. 
businessweek.com/investor/content/nov2007/pi20071112_893992.htm. 
 86. Jon Markman, Getting Rich off the Subprime Mess, MSN MONEY, Nov. 27, 2007, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/SuperModels/GettingRichOffTheSubpri
meMess.aspx. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Jon Markman, For an Elite Few, Credit Pain Means Profit, MSN MONEY, 
Nov. 15, 2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/SuperModels/CreditPainIs 
GainForASelectFew.aspx, for an explanation of how numerous hedge fund managers 
engaged in credit arbitrage because they knew “these towers of debt were houses of 
cards just waiting to be pushed over.”  Id.  In essence, these hedge fund managers sought 
to destroy confidence by betting in the $70 trillion market for credit-default swaps 
(CDSs), a set of securities that are issued by financial institutions as a kind of insurance 
policy on debt: 
The arbitrage funds bought the credit-default swaps on the investment banks 
that issued the CDOs and shorted investment banks’ stocks, two actions that 
created the impression of vulnerability among other market players.  It’s a bit 
like taking out a life insurance policy and buying a headstone for a sick 
relative.  Someone might get the impression that your uncle’s prospects aren’t 
good. 
   You might wonder how there could be $70 trillion in CDS money out there, 
and the reason is pretty interesting.  Imagine that you are at a horse race at 
which the winner can earn a $10 billion prize, which in this case would be the 
amount a CDS would pay off in the event of a bank default.  In the stands, 
however, are bettors with access to huge lines of credit that are betting up to $1 
trillion among themselves on the outcome of the race.  It doesn’t matter that 
the most a CDS holder could ever win is $10 billion, because the betting—or 
trading of the derivatives—is a completely separate game. 
Id. 
 89. It should also be noted that blame has been placed everywhere for the 
subprime mess.  Some experts believe much of the blame falls with the failure of the 
rating agencies to properly rate these risky investments.  See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & 
Serena Ng, How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 
2007, at A10 (stating that “[h]ad the securities initially received the risky ratings that 
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of transparency.90  Securities regulators and members of Congress seem 
to respond most effectively to a disaster,91 and once again in these 
current market failures, a disaster is unfolding.  Economic crises give 
birth to regulation, but in the case of hedge funds, not much has changed 
after LTCM’s collapse.  These recent market failures in the subprime 
crisis now present yet another opportunity for legislators and regulators 
to respond.92 
 
some of them now carry, many pension and mutual funds would have been barred by 
their own rules from buying them,” and some mortgage lenders may have refrained from 
making the loans to begin with if it had not been for the eager secondary market for 
them). 
 90. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at 125 (stating that lack of transparency 
in the markets of today is due in part to the increasing complexity of financial 
innovation).  Moreover, the GAO January 2008 Report on hedge funds noted that, 
“although most hedge funds may be willing to provide information on aggregate position 
and holdings, many hedge funds decline to share specific position transparency” due to 
the need to keep such information confidential for fear that disclosure may allow other 
market participants to capitalize on their trading positions and thus compromise the fund 
and its investors.  GAO Report, supra note 2, at 28.  This at least partially explains why 
lack of transparency is so prevalent in the hedge fund community. 
 91. Just as the tragedy of the Great Depression led to long overdue legislative 
reforms, so too did the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and several other 
corporate scandals.  See Enron Board Aided Firm’s Collapse, Senate Report Charges; 
Reforms Urged, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1133, 1145–46 (2002) (discussing findings of 
fiduciary failure, high risk accounting, conflicts of interest, excessive compensation, and 
lack of independence, leading to recommendations of legislative reform); see also 
PARTNOY, supra note 57, at 2 (“Congress expressed outrage and mollified some investors 
with relatively minor accounting reforms.”).  In an attempt to reform the financial 
markets at that time, Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, which extended 
the penalties for financial fraud, mandated increased independence of corporate 
directors, and initiated a review board to penalize unprincipled accountants.  Id. at 393. 
 92. As stated at the outset, this Comment is current as of February 2008.  
However, in the months leading up to the publication of this Comment, the subprime 
mortgage crisis developed into a full blown market meltdown, and several other failures 
of the free market materialized.  In early September 2008, the U.S. government bailed 
out The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac), two of the country’s largest financial 
institutions, due to the severe losses they endured on mortgage defaults.  James R. 
Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.  Shortly 
thereafter, ninety-four-year-old Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America for half of its 
all-time peak value because of the risky assets it carried on its balance sheets—CDOs.  
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 
2008, at A1, A19.  This caused a shock in the financial markets and was followed by 
news of bankruptcy court filings by Lehman Brothers Inc., which was selling “its 
most prized businesses before too many employees and customers walk out the door.”  
Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 
2008, at A1.  Then, “[t]he U.S. government seized control of American International 
Group, Inc.—one of the world’s biggest insurers—in an $85 billion deal that signaled the 
intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could pose to the financial system.”  
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central 
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.  AIG’s 
liquidity issues stemmed in large part from their unit which sold “credit default swap 
contracts designed to protect investors against default in an array of assets, including 
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3.  Retailization of Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are not directly available to the average investor.  Net 
worth as well as sophistication requirements must be met by all investors 
in order for the hedge funds to maintain their unregistered status.93  
Nonetheless, through a process referred to as “retailization,” hedge funds 
are made available to average small investors, typically through 
registered funds of hedge funds (FOHF).94  FOHFs are set up as a single 
fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.95  FOHFs typically have lower 
minimum investment requirements, but investing in FOHFs actually 
 
subprime mortgages.”  Id. at A6.  Shortly thereafter, “[i]n what is by far the largest bank 
failure in U.S. history, federal regulators seized Washington Mutual Inc. and struck a 
deal to sell the bulk of its operations to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.” which “mark[ed] a 
new low point in the country’s mortgage crisis.”  Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, 
Sold off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
26, 2008, at A1.  Then, “President George W. Bush signed into law an unprecedented 
$700 billion plan to rescue the U.S. financial system, one of the largest-ever government 
interventions in the nation’s economy.”  Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout 
Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4–5, 2008, at A1.  The next week 
was characterized as the “worst week in its 112-year history” for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average.  E.S. Browning et al., Wild Day Caps Worst Week Ever for Stocks, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11–12, 2008, at A1.  On October 23, 2008, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan testified before the House of Representatives Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform regarding the breakdown in U.S. credit markets and 
stated, “[t]he consequent surge in global demand for U.S. subprime securities by banks, 
hedge, and pension funds supported by unrealistically positive rating designations by 
credit agencies was, in my judgment, the core of the problem.”  Dr. Alan Greenspan, 
Testimony Before the House Committee of Oversight and Government Reform 3 (Oct. 
23, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081023100438.pdf.  Thus, the 
predictions of this Comment have unfortunately begun to unfold, as blame for the 
economic downturn is being placed in large part by the surge in demand of subprime 
securities by hedge funds, underscoring the relevance of this Comment’s proposal to 
indirectly regulate hedge funds. 
 93. Hedge funds usually seek exemption under Rule 506 of Regulation D, which is 
a safe harbor for private offerings.  Antoszewski, supra note 9, at 398.  This is how 
hedge funds are able to raise money and remain exempt from the registration 
requirements of the 1933 Act.  The SEC realized the expense associated with securities 
registration and disclosure, and created exemptions for certain types of securities and 
certain types of transactions.  See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 
403 (8th ed. 1998).  In doing so, the SEC weighed the benefits and burdens of disclosure, 
taking into account the type of offering and the type of investor.  The United States 
Supreme Court realized that certain high net worth or institutional investors are “able to 
fend for themselves” and access information, and thus do not need the protections of the 
Securities Act.  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–26 (1953). 
 94. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up 
on Hedge Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds, http://sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 95. Id. 
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subjects the investor to two layers of fees—the fees charged by the 
FOHF and those charged by the underlying hedge funds.96  The 
retailization of hedge funds is another illustration of how the hedge fund 
industry is beginning to find a way into average investors’ portfolios, 
exposing them to risks they likely are not able to bear or comprehend.97  
This underscores the importance of maintaining adequate market 
discipline within the hedge fund industry, which is the principal aim of 
the indirect regulatory proposal of this Comment. 
4.  Increase in Growth and Increase in Fraud 
Alfred Winslow Jones is credited as the first investor to start a hedge 
fund.98  Jones held short and long positions in stocks and sought to 
insulate himself against market fluctuation.99  Modern hedge funds have 
grown in terms of investment strategies and number of assets, and now 
incorporate all of the complexities of modern finance.100  In 1968, there 
were roughly 215 hedge funds.101  By 2007, the number of hedge funds 
had grown to nearly 9000.102 
As hedge funds have grown, so too have incidences of fraud enforcement 
cases against hedge funds.103  These fraud enforcement cases have included: 
“misappropriation of assets; misrepresentation of portfolio performance; 
falsification of experience, credentials, and past returns; misleading 
disclosure regarding claimed trading strategies; and improper valuation 
of assets.”104 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. As described in the introduction of this Comment, another way that hedge funds 
have reached many average investors is through pension fund investment into hedge funds. 
 98. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 25 (2000). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 26.  To understand the downside of financial innovation, see BOOKSTABER, 
supra note 21, stating: 
[T]he positive effects of innovation come at a price.  Innovation increases complexity.  
Many innovative instruments are in the form of derivatives with conditional 
and nonlinear payoffs.  When a market dislocation arises, it is difficult to know 
how the prices of these instruments will react.  Innovation and mechanical 
efficiency have also increased complexity by pushing markets to become more 
interconnected. 
Id. at 255. 
 101. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 98, at 26. 
 102. Testimony of Steel, supra note 21, at 62. 
 103. DIV. OF INV. MGMT. & OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, 
U.S. SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 72–75 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
 104. Id. at 73–74. 
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In 2003, the SEC held a two day roundtable on hedge funds, which 
assembled experts to debate important issues in the hedge fund industry.105  
Participants included hedge fund managers, consultants, service providers, 
academics, prime brokers, investment bankers, investors, and foreign and 
U.S. regulators.106  It was noted that some of these experts “argued that 
if the SEC staff were able regularly to examine hedge fund managers, 
not only would incidents of fraud potentially decrease, but investors 
would have more information upon which to make their investment 
decision.”107 
These failures of the free market approach to restrain hedge funds lead 
to the conclusion that something more needs to be done—something 
other than direct regulation. 
II.  THEORY AND RATIONALE BEHIND INDIRECT                                             
HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
A.  General Theory of Indirect Regulation 
The proposal this Comment puts forth in essence seeks to change the 
behavior of hedge funds.  Because natural market forces are insufficient 
to cause that change, and because directly changing that behavior is 
unlikely and infeasible, this Comment assesses changing the behavior of 
hedge funds indirectly. 
Behavior can be regulated by four types of constraint—law, social 
norms, markets, and natural constraints.108  In addition, regulation has 
 
 105. The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market 
Risk: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 60–61 (2003) 
[hereinafter Donaldson Testimony] (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/052203tswhd.htm. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–63 
(1998).  The following provides an illustration of how regulators could take into account 
these four types of behavioral constraints: 
Say the government’s objective is to reduce the consumption of cigarettes.  
There are any number of means that the government could select to this single 
end.  A law could ban smoking.  (That would be law regulating the behavior it 
wants to change directly.)  Or the law could tax cigarettes.  (That would be the 
law regulating the market to reduce the supply of cigarettes, to decrease the 
consumption of cigarettes.)  Or the law could fund a public ad campaign 
against smoking.  (That would be the law regulating social norms, as a means 
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two aspects—direct and an indirect: “In its direct aspect, the law uses its 
traditional means to direct an object of regulation (whether the individual 
regulated, norms, the market, or architecture); in its indirect aspect, it 
regulates these other regulators so that they regulate the individual 
differently.”109 
B.  Direct Versus Indirect and Application to Hedge Funds 
The objective of this proposal is to minimize systemic risk to the 
economy by ensuring that hedge fund market participants have certain 
material information about the hedge funds with which they are involved.  
This Comment proposes to directly regulate hedge fund market participants, 
so as to indirectly regulate hedge funds. 
1.  Most Agree that Change Is Needed 
Regulating hedge funds is clearly not a new topic—academics 
continue to assess the issue110—and the SEC has already made an 
attempt to directly regulate them by mandating that they register as 
investment advisers.111  In 1998, in the aftermath of LTCM, then Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified before Congress regarding 
 
to regulating smoking behavior.)  Or the law could regulate nicotine in cigarettes, 
requiring manufacturers to reduce or eliminate nicotine.  (That would be the law 
regulating the architecture of cigarettes, as a way to reduce their addictiveness, 
as a way to reduce the consumption of cigarettes.)  Each action by the government 
can be expected to have some effect (call that its benefit) on the consumption 
of cigarettes; each action also has a cost.  The regulator must test whether the 
costs of each outweigh the benefits or, better, which most efficiently achieves 
the regulator’s end. 
Id. at 667–68. 
 109. Id. at 666.  It is also important to remember that the law often regulates 
indirectly: 
When regulating indirectly, law changes the constraints of one of these other 
structures of constraint.  Law can tax cigarettes, directly regulating the market 
so as to indirectly change the consumption of cigarettes.  Law can put 
advertisements on television showing the consequences of not wearing seat 
belts, directly working on a norm against seat belts so as to indirectly effect the 
use of seat belts.  Law can order that buildings be built differently, directly 
regulating building codes so as to indirectly regulate discriminating behavior 
with respect to the disabled.  And obviously, law can regulate all three of these 
constraints simultaneously, when, for example, it cuts the supply of drugs, runs 
“just say no” campaigns, and sprays fields of marijuana with paraquat.  Law 
can select among these various techniques in selecting the end it wants to 
achieve.  Which it selects depends on the return from each. 
Id. at 671–72. 
 110. See supra note 9 for an overview of law review article recommendations on 
direct hedge fund regulation. 
 111. See supra Part I.B.2.a for an overview of the Goldstein case, which held the 
SEC’s rule to be an instance of arbitrary rulemaking. 
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the appropriate regulatory approach to take with hedge funds.  His testimony 
questioned the feasibility of direct regulation and advocated for indirect 
regulation: 
[D]oes the fact that investors have lost most of their capital and creditors may 
take some losses on their exposure to LTCM call for direct regulation of hedge 
funds?  It is questionable whether hedge funds can be effectively directly 
regulated in the United States alone. . . .  [H]edge funds’ physical presence is small.  
Given the amazing communication capabilities available virtually around the 
globe, trades can be initiated from almost any location.  Indeed, most hedge 
funds are only a short step from cyberspace.  Any direct U.S. regulations restricting 
their flexibility will doubtless induce the more aggressive funds to emigrate 
from under our jurisdiction.  The best we can do in my judgment is what we do 
today: Regulate them indirectly . . . .  We are thus able to monitor far better hedge 
funds’ activity, especially as they influence U.S. financial markets.  If the funds 
move abroad, our oversight will diminish.112 
Because direct regulation could lead hedge funds to react by emigrating 
away from U.S. regulatory jurisdiction, as Greenspan predicted, it is 
worthwhile to consider as an alternative some more aggressive forms of 
indirect regulation.113 
Hedge funds continue to be closely monitored.  In late February 2008, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on 
hedge funds.114  The report essentially concluded that hedge funds remain a 
source of potential systemic risk and require continued monitoring.115  
The GAO’s report also noted that: 
 
 112. See Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 160–61 (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, 
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm. 
 113. See Steven Pearlstein, Regulate Hedge Funds? Nope, Just the Investors, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2006, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/15/AR2006081501259.html (outlining briefly the benefit of 
indirectly regulating hedge funds, and stating, “Regulate hedge funds?  Why bother 
when you can just as easily regulate the outfits that invest in them, lend them money and 
execute their trades?”).  Two examples of potential direct regulation include forcing 
adviser registration under the Advisers Act and amending the definition of Accredited 
Investor and Qualified Client.  See Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed 
Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1591–94 
(2003). 
 114. The report (1) described the extent of federal financial regulatory oversight on 
hedge funds under existing authorities, (2) examined the steps counterparties, investors, 
and creditors have taken to apply market discipline on hedge funds, and (3) assessed the 
potential systemic risk hedge funds pose and set forth the ways in which regulators have 
addressed that risk.  GAO Report, supra note 2, at Highlights. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
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[F]or market discipline to be effective, (1) investors, creditors, and counterparties 
must have access to, and act upon, sufficient and timely information to assess a 
fund’s risk profile; (2) investors, creditors, and counterparties must have sound 
risk management policies, procedures, and systems to evaluate and limit their 
credit risk exposures to hedge funds; and (3) creditors and counterparties must 
increase the costs or decrease the availability of credit to their hedge fund 
clients as the creditworthiness of the latter changes.116 
The GAO report recognized that market participants need access to 
more information and that they need better risk management policies to 
maintain an appropriate amount of credit exposure to hedge funds.117  
Under the current regulatory framework, hedge funds are not required to 
provide this information to market participants.118  However, if market 
participants were directly regulated to only deal with hedge funds that 
provided them with certain material information, hedge funds would be 
indirectly regulated and the goals of the GAO report would be 
accomplished. 
2.  Infeasibility of Direct Regulation 
Hedge funds bring many benefits to the economy, as previously 
discussed, so the risk of an exodus of such funds caused by direct 
regulation should not be ignored.119  In May 2006, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Bernanke also commented on why direct regulation of hedge 
funds is unjustified and inappropriate: 
Direct regulation may be justified when market discipline is ineffective at constraining 
excessive leverage and risk-taking but, in the case of hedge funds, the reasonable 
presumption is that market discipline can work.  Investors, creditors, and 
counterparties have significant incentives to rein in hedge funds’ risk-taking.  
Moreover, direct regulation would impose costs in the form of moral hazard, the 
likely loss of private market discipline, and possible limits on funds’ ability to 
provide market liquidity.120 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. PWG 1999 Report, supra note 3, at 6. 
 119. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 8. 
 120. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10.  In the midst of the turmoil in the 
credit markets following the subprime mortgage collapse and the implosion of several 
funds, the “Great Unwind,” there are signs that counterparties are adjusting their dealings 
with hedge funds even absent direct regulation.  See Jeff Benjamin, Subprime Chaos, 
Credit Crunch Recast Alternatives; Emphasis Is Shifting to Management Skills, INVESTMENT 
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, at 18, quoting George Feiger, chairman and chief executive of Contango 
Capital Advisors Inc. as stating: 
Until now, much of the growth in the hedge funds industry has come from the 
use of leverage, but we’re now looking at a systematic reduction in the 
willingness of prime brokers to provide leverage. . . .  This will lead to a huge 
rebalancing of the whole industry away from reliance on leverage and toward 
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Many free market theorists in addition to Alan Greenspan, who 
generally oppose any sort of hedge fund regulation, cite to benefits that 
hedge funds provide—increased diversification for investors121 and 
benefits to capital markets overall such as liquidity, price discovery, and 
risk dispersion.122  Further, by providing liquidity to the marketplace, 
hedge funds make markets attractive to investors by bringing information to 
markets and enhancing market efficiency.123  Hedge funds also play a 
positive role of dispersing risk by developing new risk management tools 
and techniques.124  However, the same Treasury Department officials who 
cite to the advantages of hedge funds also recognize that increased 
observation is necessary due to hedge fund managers’ excessive use of 
leverage, the increase in transaction volumes, and the increasing impact 
of hedge funds on the overall market: 
While hedge funds can provide benefits to investors and the overall marketplace, 
they present some challenges as well.  The scale, complexity and dynamic nature 
of these business models and their investment strategies emphasize why we 
believe heightened vigilance is necessary.  Managers are now relying more 
heavily on the use of leverage, transaction volumes are increasing, and the 
impact of hedge funds on markets continues to grow.125 
Therefore, this Comment recommends an indirect regulatory scheme 
which seeks to preserve the abovementioned benefits of hedge funds to 
the U.S. capital markets, while minimizing any potential systemic risk. 
 
management skill, and from there we’ll see a sorting out and massive 
compression on the leverage side of the business. 
Id. 
 121. RESEARCH DEP’T., CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & DERIVATIVES MKTS., THE BENEFITS 
OF HEDGE FUNDS: 2006 UPDATE, at 14 (2006), available at http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/ 
research/pdffiles/benefitsofhedgefunds.pdf. 
 122. Testimony of Steel, supra note 21, at 61; see also Riding the Cycle: Why 
Volatility Will Never Go Away, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2008, at 67 (“[V]olatility has 
moved to a structurally lower level thanks to the activity of hedge funds and to the 
development of complex products and derivatives.  A new, more sophisticated financial 
system had spread risk more efficiently.”). 
 123. Testimony of Steel, supra note 21, at 62. 
 124. Id.  Steel notes that because “hedge funds are often willing counterparties on 
derivatives transactions with financial institutions seeking to distribute the risks inherent 
in their normal business activities” and because hedge funds are attractive to investors 
because of the diversification they offer and are able “to engage in absolute value return 
strategies,” hedge funds afford investors the advantage of being able to profit in down 
markets.  Id. 
 125. Id. 
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3.  Unlikelihood of Direct Regulation 
As discussed previously, the SEC attempted to directly regulate hedge 
funds by requiring that they register under the Advisers Act.126  This 
attempt did not withstand judicial scrutiny, as the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled against the SEC in Goldstein.127  Additionally, in its latest 
report, the Presidents Working Group on Financial Markets, which was 
formed in 1999 after LTCM failed, advocated against direct regulation of 
hedge funds.128  In fact, it stated that “risk-taking is the rule and government 
regulation is the exception.”129  Therefore, it is clear that direct regulation of 
hedge funds is not the preferred solution of both regulators and the 
hedge fund community. 
4.  Applied Theory of Indirect Regulation to Hedge Funds 
A principal goal of proponents of hedge fund regulation is to minimize 
systemic risk.130  As previously mentioned, systemic risk refers to the 
“potential that a single event, such as a financial institution’s loss or 
failure, may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults that affect 
the financial system so significantly that the real economy is adversely 
affected.”131  The indirect regulatory proposal set forth in this Comment 
will minimize systemic risk because market participants will be more 
informed prior to entering into a transaction with any given hedge fund. 
LTCM’s collapse accelerated the first comprehensive assessment by 
lawmakers of the potential systemic risks brought about by the thriving 
hedge fund industry.132  In theory, direct hedge fund regulation would 
reduce systemic risk through a mechanism of mandatory disclosure, 
because fund participants would be aware of the risks involved and 
therefore would be able to act to reduce their risk before any sort of 
market failure.133  For example, if hedge funds disclosed more information 
 
 126. See supra Part I.B.2.a for an overview of the Goldstein case. 
 127. Id. 
 128. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND 
U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF 
CAPITAL 1 (2007) [hereinafter Agreement], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Testimony of Steel, supra note 21, at 63. 
 131. Id. (cautioning also that significant losses by a highly leveraged hedge fund 
could be problematic for the entire financial system). 
 132. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10. 
 133. This relates to the concept of disclosure that is at the core of the federal 
securities laws.  See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and 
Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 478 (2006), for an interesting perspective on 
disclosure regulation and some of the costs of disclosure.  The author notes, “Our securities 
regulatory regime is a disclosure regime.”  Id. at 478. 
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about their leverage, creditors would be able to better understand the 
risks in extending credit to hedge funds, regardless of whether they 
requested the information.  In better understanding these risks, creditors 
may choose not to extend credit to certain hedge funds, or they may 
choose to limit the amount they extend.  Similarly, if hedge funds disclosed 
more information about their leverage, large institutional investors such 
as pension funds would be better equipped to assess the risks involved in 
investing workers’ retirement money into a given hedge fund.  For example, 
pension fund managers who truly understand the risks associated with 
hedge fund investments and the extent of their leverage might choose to 
limit their exposure to hedge funds as part of their portfolio of alternative 
investments.  Similarly, they may choose not to invest in certain hedge 
funds. 
The goal is disclosure, but because directly regulating hedge funds to 
disclose more information is unlikely and infeasible, this Comment 
proposes indirect regulation—mandating investor and counterparty risk 
management practices.  Indirect regulation would shift the regulatory 
focus away from hedge funds, and onto hedge fund market participants.  
If market participants were mandated to only deal with hedge funds which 
offer a minimum amount of disclosure, the regulatory goal of greater 
disclosure could be achieved indirectly. 
If hedge funds are directly regulated, there is a risk that many funds 
would be invited to conduct business from abroad.  This would reduce 
the benefits hedge funds provide to capital markets in the United States 
and afford the United States less oversight—without reducing undesirable 
risks and potential harms.  This Comment’s proposed indirect regulatory 
scheme would indirectly force hedge funds to disclose certain material 
information when they seek investment capital from United States-based 
private pension funds or leverage from creditors.  Thus, the potential 
negative incentive upon hedge funds to move overseas to escape a 
regulatory burden is greatly reduced because the regulatory focus would 
not be on the funds, but rather on market participants such as United 
States-based investors, like pension funds, upon whom the hedge funds 
are greatly reliant.134 
 
 134. See Figure 1, infra Part III.D, which illustrates that the bulk of the world’s 
largest pension funds are U.S. based. 
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III.  THE MECHANICS OF INDIRECT HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
This Comment proposes implementing indirect hedge fund regulation 
by focusing on market participants such as pension fund investors and 
banks that lend to hedge funds.  The following is a brief summary of the 
key proposals of this Comment: (1) the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)135 should be amended to state that any 
private pension fund that seeks to invest money into a hedge fund may 
only do so if that hedge fund discloses certain material information and 
is registered with the SEC; (2) Congress should enact new legislation 
that would allow hedge funds to voluntarily register with the SEC as 
hedge funds, to provide an avenue for hedge funds to, at a minimum, 
provide the SEC with audited financials, follow SEC rules in calculating 
the value of their assets, and disclose their trading strategies in 
confidence;136 and (3) an international regulatory solution is necessary to 
address the arduous task of uniformly regulating hedge fund creditors.  
This could be done through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
an international organization which serves as a bank for central banks, 
which, in its capacity as a forum to promote discussion and policy among 
central banks, should establish international banking standards with 
hedge funds.  These standards should include mandating that all banks 
engaging in hedge fund financing should (1) only do so if the hedge 
funds provide them with audited financials, (2) follow SEC or other 
accepted rules in calculating the value of their assets, and (3) disclose 
their trading strategies in confidence. 
A.  How Pension Funds Fit into an Indirect Hedge                                     
Fund Regulation Framework 
This Comment proposes that ERISA should be amended to mandate 
that if a private pension fund chooses to invest assets into a hedge fund, 
it can only do so if the hedge fund provides the pension fund with certain 
material information made available through SEC registration.137  Similarly, 
 
 135. ERISA is a federal law protecting individuals in private pension plans.  See 
infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 136. Because hedge funds are not yet statutorily defined, this can be done by simply 
using the commonly accepted definitions and standards to designate a fund as a hedge 
fund.  See supra text accompanying notes 2–5. 
 137. Despite possible concerns, Regulation D would not “lose its punch” through this 
Comment’s proposed indirect regulatory scheme, whereby private offerings otherwise 
exempt from registration under Regulation D are now registering, because Regulation D 
would only be limited to the extent necessary to consider a broader public interest when 
hedge funds pose systemic risks to the entire economy.  Regulation D is premised on the 
notion that certain sophisticated or high net worth investors are able to fend for 
themselves and therefore do not need the protection of the federal securities laws.  See 
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banks that extend credit to hedge funds and provide them with leverage 
should be restricted to do so only if the hedge fund makes certain 
material disclosures.  This would indirectly cause hedge funds to change 
their behavior and disclose more information to market participants.  This 
indirect regulatory scheme promotes market discipline by providing 
hedge funds with an incentive to disclose material information.138 
1.  An Introduction to the Pension Fund-Hedge Fund Affair 
Because pension funds account for about forty percent of all institutional 
investment money, making them by far the largest institutional investor,139 
there is inevitably a risk in leaving the pension fund-hedge fund relationship 
unregulated.  Pension funds are understood as funds established by a 
corporation, labor union, governmental entity, or other organization, 
to disburse the pension benefits of retired workers.140  “Pension funds 
invest billions of dollars annually in the stock and bond markets” and 
thus play a major role in the supply-demand balance of the markets.141 
Some pension funds have small stakes in hedge funds, although others 
 
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–26 (1953).  Thus, by limiting hedge funds 
to sophisticated investors, disclosure should be unnecessary.  This theory recognizes that 
these investors are generally able to protect themselves due to their sophistication, 
purchasing power, and other factors.  However, the theory is insufficient in a key 
respect—it does not take into account the interest of protecting the economy at large 
from the systemic risks posed by hedge funds.  Moreover, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Bernanke, reflecting on the collapse of LTCM, has also recognized that even 
sophisticated hedge fund investors fail to ask the right questions: “Investors, perhaps 
awed by the reputations of LTCM’s principals, did not ask sufficiently tough questions 
about the risks that were being taken to generate the high returns.”  Bernanke May 2006 
Speech, supra note 10.  This suggests that the premise of Regulation D, that certain investors 
are able to fend for themselves, is not always applicable to hedge fund investors. 
 138. Hedge funds that choose not to take money from United States based private 
pension funds would have no incentive to register and disclose any information.  This is 
because hedge funds are not being directly regulated and therefore they are not being 
forced to change their behavior.  The funds that remain unregistered, however, would not 
add much systemic risk to the U.S. economy because any collapse would directly affect 
only foreign pension fund investors.  Hedge funds that choose to seek investment and 
debt capital from abroad may still pose some systemic risk to the world economy, 
depending on the size of the fund. 
 139. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16. 
 140. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
HANDBOOK 673 (6th ed. 2003). 
 141. Id.  In addition, earnings on pension fund investment portfolios are tax 
deferred.  Id.  Fund managers ensure that the rate of return on their portfolios equals or 
surmounts the anticipated payout needed by making actuarial assumptions about how 
much they will be required to pay out to pensioners.  Id. 
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have invested more than twenty percent of their assets into hedge 
funds.142  The number of “U.S. corporate defined-benefit pension funds 
investing in hedge funds has increased to 24% in 2006, up from 19% in 
2004 and 12% in 2000.”143 Although statistics vary, in 2006 the total 
share of corporate pension fund assets allocated to hedge funds was 
approximately 2.1%.144 To provide an example, Boeing planned on 
changing the composition of its pension plan by increasing its bond 
allocation from 37% to 45%, cutting equity from 55% to 28% and 
simultaneously increasing its investment in alternative investments—
including private equity, real estate, and hedge funds—from 2% to 
14%.145  According to the Casey Quirk consulting firm, roughly 10% of 
all large pension funds are invested in hedge funds, and that is expected 
to reach 18% in the next few years.146  This could be a dangerous trend 
considering some pension funds have lost substantial amounts of retirees’ 
money by investing in hedge funds, such as the San Diego County 
Retirement fund which lost $100 million after the hedge fund Amaranth 
Advisers collapsed in 2006.147  The San Diego Employees’ Retirement 
Association has alleged that the hedge fund repeatedly misled it about its 
strategies and activities in the marketplace.148 This leads many to question 
whether pensions should invest in hedge funds at all, given that hedge 
funds’ risks are hard to measure and the “sole purpose [of pensions funds], 
by law, is to pay out predetermined benefits to retired workers.”149 
Pension benefits are deemed so crucial that a federal agency, the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), covers corporate pension 
failures, and many fear that a taxpayer funded bailout would result in the 
PBGC’s failure.150  Pension failures by state and local governments are 
covered by taxpayers.151  Further, because pension benefits are paid on a 
consistent schedule, it is questionable whether it is wise to depend on 
investments that yield returns which are difficult to predict, managed by 
private partnerships that offer little disclosure about their undertaking, 
and charge some of the most outrageous fees on Wall Street.152  Pension 
 
 142. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16.  For more data on hedge funds, see Hedge Fund 
Research, Inc., http://www.hedgefundresearch.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 143. KLUNK, supra note 17. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Whitney Kvasager, Boeing Cuts Equity, Raises Bonds, Alts, FUNDFIRE, Apr. 
26, 2007, http://www.fundfire.com/articles/20070426/boeing_cuts_equity_raises_bonds_alts. 
 146. Peterson, supra note 17, at C8. 
 147. Id.; see also Strasburg, supra note 18. 
 148. Peterson, supra note 17, at C8. 
 149. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16; see also MANGIERO, supra note 16. 
 150. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16; see also KLUNK, supra note 17. 
 151. Atlas & Walsh, supra note 16. 
 152. Id. 
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fund managers are starting to become very aggressive in seeking high 
returns, hoping for no downturns.153 
The nation’s largest private pension fund, the General Motors fund, 
managing over $90 billion, was also one of the first to invest in hedge 
funds following a successful test run.154  “Most pension funds have modest 
stakes of less than 5 percent, according to a recent J. P. Morgan survey.”155  
“[T]he 100 largest companies that sponsor pension funds predicted last 
year that their average long-term returns would be 8.5 percent, according 
to Milliman, Inc., an actuarial firm.”156  Yet some pension fund managers 
do not engage in the sort of analysis that the Department of Labor 
expects of them regarding investing in derivatives.157  In fact, some were 
not even aware that they had derivatives in their portfolios.158 
Some, like former Treasury Assistant Secretary Emil Henry, believe 
that because corporate pension funds are inherently risk averse investors, 
they will be diligent in investigating various investments before 
committing their funds.159 Secretary Henry has stated that the hedge fund 
industry will impose risk management upon itself to mitigate risk in 
order to attract pension fund capital.160 Other experts view the use of 
derivatives-based strategies to be increasingly complex for pension fund 
managers to oversee.161  Senators Max Baucus and Chuck Grassley are 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  The article noted that regulators of pension funds, labor department 
officials, declined to comment on the hedge fund-pension fund phenomena, and referred 
to a 1996 letter the department wrote to the United States comptroller of the currency.  
Id.  The letter stated that the Labor Department still expected pension officials to 
exercise care when investing in derivatives, a type of investment product hedge funds 
often trade.  Id.  The letter also reminded pension officials to understand their hedge fund 
investments, particularly how they would perform and how they may affect the pension 
fund, under various conditions.  Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.; see also KLUNK, supra note 17; MANGIERO, supra note 16.  The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) modified the rules under which hedge funds are deemed 
fiduciaries of pension funds.  KLUNK, supra note 17.  Under the PPA, limited partnerships and 
investment funds, including hedge funds, are not deemed fiduciaries under ERISA if less 
than twenty-five percent of the partnership or fund assets come from ERISA-covered 
plans.  Id.  This Comment, however, does not suggest making hedge funds ERISA 
fiduciaries because that would shift who is managing the pension assets to hedge funds, 
which would produce an even worse scenario.  Rather, this Comment recommends amending 
ERISA to require pension funds to only invest in registered hedge funds. 
 159. KLUNK, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at D-1. 
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among many who have expressed concern that hedge funds may pose a 
threat to workers’ retirement security.162 It is prudent, therefore, to 
mandate that pension fund managers only invest in hedge funds that 
provide an appropriate amount of necessary disclosure. 
Some believe that because hedge funds provide pension funds with 
“alpha,”163 returns uncorrelated to market performance, they should 
therefore be unrestricted in their dealings with hedge funds, aside from 
the ordinary fiduciary duties they owe to the plan trustees.164 This 
argument is flawed, however, because pension funds can still achieve 
this alpha in registered hedge funds; the difference is they will be 
generating it with more consistency and less risk.165 Others argue that 
any hedge fund that accepts pension money should be regulated “because 
doing so exposes everyday Americans to outsized investments.”166  
There is clearly a risk in leaving the pension fund-hedge fund relationship 
unregulated; however, because direct regulation of hedge funds is 
unlikely and infeasible, the regulatory focus should be aimed at market 
participants such as pension funds.167 
 
 162. KLUNK, supra note 17, at 6. 
 163. Alpha is a coefficient which measures the piece of an investment’s return that 
arises from specific (nonmarket) risk.  DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 140, at 187.  
Explained otherwise, alpha is a mathematical evaluation of the expected return from an 
investment’s basic values, such as the growth rate in earnings per share.  Id.  Alpha is 
distinct from the beta coefficient, which measures the amount of return caused by 
volatility.  Id.  To illustrate, “an alpha of 1.25 indicates that a stock is projected to rise 
25% in price in a year when the return on the market and the stock’s beta are both zero.  
An investment whose price is low relative to its alpha is undervalued and considered a 
good selection.  In the case of a mutual fund, alpha measures the relationship between 
the fund’s performance and its beta over a three-year period.”  Id. 
 164. Such fiduciary duties include the “Prudent Pension Rule,” which requires 
pension fund fiduciaries to invest in accordance with “the prudential principles of 
security, profitability, and liquidity.”  INS. & PRIVATE PENSIONS COMM. & WORKING 
PARTY ON PRIVATE PENSIONS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON 
PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT 2 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
59/53/36316399.pdf. 
 165. It is also worth noting that while hedge funds may be considered “alternative 
investments” for investors such as pension funds, some believe that one day they will 
become the standard.  See BOOKSTABER, supra note 21, stating: “This simple point, that 
an unconstrained investment process will dominate a constrained one, means that in the 
end hedge funds, whether in their present or some reformulated structure, will move 
from being the alternative to the standard.”  Id. at 253.  This reality only advances the 
argument that something needs to be done in order to initiate market discipline among 
hedge funds market participants before their popularity increases. 
 166. Housing & Hedge Funds, supra note 67. 
 167. Another explanation of the additional risk pension funds are beginning to carry 
due to investing assets in hedge funds has been given by the report of the Counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group II, a group of senior officials from private financial 
institutions.  The group notes that because the assets in a hedge fund arrangement are not 
held in trust and governed by a trust agreement, as in the traditional pension fund model, 
no protection exists for the pension fund.  Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at D-3.  
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a 
federal law that provides protection to individuals in private pension 
plans.168 ERISA currently has no controls in place to monitor the number 
of hedge funds which plan sponsors invest in or the amount invested.169  
Commentators argue that such information should be made available, 
and would allow policymakers to enumerate the share of pension assets 
that are being invested in hedge funds and differentiate between pension 
funds whose hedge fund investments are directed primarily in one or two 
funds as opposed to those that are more diversified and spread over a 
greater number of hedge funds.170 
The increased risk that the allocation of assets into hedge funds brings 
about to pension funds illustrates the need for pension funds to gather 
more information about these investments before placing retirees’ money in 
them.  The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II (CRMPG 
II), a group of senior officials from private financial institutions, assessed 
the increased risk pension funds assume in hedge fund investments and 
suggested a solution that would only lead to more of the same—that 
pension fund fiduciaries should monitor their investments in hedge 
funds.171  Such recommendations are inadequate, however, given the 
stakes and the lessons of the San Diego County Retirement fund. 
 
Moreover, as pension funds increase their investment in hedge funds, which keep funds 
assets with one or more prime brokers, the pension fund assumes many additional risks, 
especially considering that hedge fund managers are often not plan fiduciaries.  Id. 
at D-3, D-4. 
 168. U.S. Department of Labor, Health Plans & Benefits: Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act—ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2008).  ERISA calls for plans to (1) make available to participants 
information, including critical information regarding plan features and funding; (2) set 
forth fiduciary responsibilities for those who manage and control plan assets; (3) set up a 
grievance and appeals process for participants to obtain benefits from their plans; and, 
(4) provide participants with the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.  
Id. 
 169. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
 170. KLUNK, supra note 17, at 6. 
 171. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at D-4.  The group recommended that 
fiduciaries “continue to conduct and, as applicable, enhance their due diligence and 
monitoring practices regarding their investments and investment managers.”  Id.  The 
group said that fiduciaries should be able to: “(a) monitor indirect investments, including 
derivative positions and/or risk characteristics, on a timely basis to ensure their 
investment managers are not taking risks beyond represented levels in terms of allowable 
investment exposures, leverage, etc.; (b) aggregate risk across their entire pool of assets 
in order to understand portfolio level implications; and (c) determine whether their 
investment managers are adhering to a stated investment strategy or style.”  Id.  Further, 
the group called for fiduciaries and investment managers to work together, and with 
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There are several ways to regulate pension funds’ ability to invest in 
hedge funds.172  Rather than recommending what pension fund managers 
should expect to receive from hedge funds, it is more prudent to require 
that pension funds receive such disclosures by the hedge fund through 
this Comment’s proposed amendment to ERISA.  It does not appear that 
such a requirement will be a crippling burden for either party to comply 
with.173 
2.  State and Local Government Pension Funds 
A regulatory consideration that arises in the context of state and local 
government pension funds is that they are exempt from ERISA—ERISA 
only applies to private sector and federal pension funds.174  This means 
that each individual state regulates its respective state and local pension 
funds. 
The average public pension fund has about eight percent of its assets 
in alternative investments.175  Alternative investments can include anything 
from private equity to real estate, to commodities, to hedge funds.176  
Many public pension funds,177 especially those that are underfunded,178 
are looking to diversify their portfolios and generate higher returns and 
so have been increasing the amount of assets they dedicate to alternative 
 
industry groups, to put together a consensus on commonly accepted methods of 
“supplying risk characteristics on a bilateral basis” to provide ample information to 
generate an “independent analysis of credit and market risk being undertaken by 
institutional investors, as required by ERISA.”  Id.  Such efforts should result in the enabling 
of “fiduciary investors to measure and monitor aggregate risk exposures in a manner that 
is consistent with their responsibilities as fiduciaries.”  Id. 
 172. Stewart, supra note 11, at 10–11.  Some ways include: “limiting investments in 
unregulated investment instruments; limiting investment in geared instruments; limiting 
investment to ‘fund of funds’; monitoring investment via governance requirements.”  Id. 
at 8. 
 173. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 174. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1003. 
 175. Adrienne Carter, Hopped up on Hedge Funds, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2006, at 46. 
 176. Daniel Judge, Quant Managers Steal a Lead Says Morgan Study, INVESTMENT 
ADVISER, Apr. 11, 2005, available at http://www.ftadviser.com/InvestmentAdviser/ 
Archive/News/article/20050411/e6efc626-ea50-11dc-abcd-0015171400aa/Quant-Managers- 
steal-a-lead-says-Morgan-study.jsp.  The article notes that alternative investments include 
“hedge funds, property funds, private equity, structured products and portable alpha 
structures.”  Id.; see also Pension Funds Down on Alternative Investments, NIKKEI 
WKLY. (Tokyo), Nov. 5, 2007, at 24 (“Investments in hedge funds, real estate investment 
trusts and other unconventional financial instruments are frequently being employed in 
pension fund management, with a Nikkei Inc. survey of major corporate pension funds 
finding that 75% of respondents include such alternative investments in their portfolios.”). 
 177. Public pension funds consist of state and local pension funds. 
 178. An underfunded pension fund is one whose assets are insufficient to meet its 
obligations to retirees. 
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investments.179  However, some pension funds that recently decided to 
increase their exposure to alternative investments will not be able to 
invest in the highest performing funds because the highest performing 
funds are too difficult to access.180  Therefore, they will only have access 
to hedge funds that produce lower returns. 
Some state pension funds are very large players.  The California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), for example, is the largest 
public pension fund in the United States, managing roughly $253 billion 
in assets as of December 31, 2007, for over 1.5 million California public 
employees, retirees, and their families.181  Because the recommended 
amendment to ERISA, prohibiting pension funds from investing in 
unregistered hedge funds, would not apply to state and local pensions, 
each state would control whether its state and local governmental entities 
would adopt such a rule.  There have been many attempts and calls to 
federally regulate state and local pension plans under a public sector 
equivalent to ERISA, and if any such legislation is introduced in the 
future, then this Comment’s recommendation to bar pension fund investment 
in unregistered hedge funds should also be a part of that piece of 
potential future legislation.182  An alternative approach would be to 
promulgate a uniform act which would model the proposed ERISA 
amendment recommended by this Comment, and encourage each state to 
adopt it individually into their existing regulatory scheme.183 
3.  Another Possible Pension Fund Approach 
Recognizing that there may be some resistance, even from plan 
trustees, to amending ERISA and various equivalent state regulations to 
impose an outright ban on investment in unregistered hedge funds, an 
 
 179. Carter, supra note 175. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Steve Lohr, Venture Fund to Seek Out Cost Cutters in Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2007, at C3 (noting that CalPERS is the largest public pension fund in the 
U.S.); see also CalPERS, Facts at a Glance, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/ 
about/facts/home.xml (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 182. For further reading on one such call for federal regulation of state pension 
funds, see Jon G. Miller, Is Your Client’s Government Pension Safe?: Making the Case 
for Federal Regulation, 2 ELDER L.J. 121 (1994). 
 183. The question also arises of who would enforce the rule and what remedies 
would exist for a violation of the rule.  Because the amendment to ERISA would be 
statutory, there is the possibility that individual participants could file civil suits to 
enforce the rule. 
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alternative approach is to limit, temporarily or permanently, the percentage 
of plan assets that can be invested in unregistered hedge funds to some 
value less than five percent. 
As noted, pension funds indirectly expose retail investors to complex 
instruments and strategies.  Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, in 
a May 2007 speech, reiterated that the fiduciary duties that are already 
imposed on pension fund managers should be sufficient in protecting the 
pension fund participants.184  However, it seems clear that relying on 
these fiduciary duties alone is not enough.  If mere reliance on fiduciary 
duties was sufficient, one could not explain devastating incidents such as 
the hit taken by the San Diego County Retirement fund by the collapse 
of Amaranth.185 
Other experts have recognized that it is not wise to rely on the 
fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees, simply because they likely do 
not understand the complexities of these investments.  Given the potentially 
high risk nature of their investments, hedge funds were originally 
intended for high-net worth individuals.186  Therefore, it is debatable whether 
individuals who cannot invest their discretionary savings in hedge funds 
should be exposed to them through what may be their subsistence low-
risk pension savings.187 This phenomena is justified because pensions 
are managed by knowledgeable investors, however, it is unclear whether 
pension fund trustees even comprehend these complex products.188  
Even if they do, because hedge funds are not offered directly to the 
public and are exempt from many disclosure requirements, they operate 
opaquely and by their nature are riskier for investors.189 
Therefore, although this alternative approach of limiting pension fund 
investment in unregistered hedge funds is an option, it is clearly not the 
preferential option.  As described above, this approach still places retirees’ 
money at risk by allowing a pension fund manager to invest a significant 
percentage of assets without any requisite disclosure by the hedge fund.  
 
 184. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia (via satellite): 
Regulation and Financial Innovation (May 15, 2007), http://www.federaleserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070515a.htm (noting the importance of supervising 
fiduciaries). 
 185. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
 186. Stewart, supra note 11, at 6. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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B.  Hedge Fund Creditors 
A critical component of this Comment’s proposal to indirectly regulate 
hedge funds involves focusing on hedge fund creditors—the entities that 
enable hedge funds to maintain their notorious levels of leverage.  This 
Comment recommends mandating that hedge funds’ creditors only lend to 
hedge funds that disclose certain material information as specified 
below.  Although the pension fund-hedge fund relationship is relatively 
straightforward to explain, the hedge fund-creditor relationship is intentionally 
made far more complex.  The discussion of how hedge funds are able to 
become so highly leveraged necessarily involves detailing some peculiarities 
within the investment banking business. 
1.  Demystifying Hedge Fund Leverage 
As noted, other major players in the hedge fund mix are Wall Street 
trading firms and investment banks.  These entities provide hedge funds 
with the leverage that makes them so risky.190  Regulating hedge fund 
lenders, however, is no easy task.  Hedge funds typically use prime brokerage 
accounts to achieve their leverage.  Firms that offer prime brokerage 
provide various services including financing, customer support, and 
research.191  The recent growth of the hedge fund industry has made 
prime brokerage a substantial source of revenues for banks and other 
providers.192 
Because prime brokers are typically large Wall Street trading firms 
like Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs, one would suspect that the SEC 
margin requirements of Regulation T would apply and therefore limit the 
amount of leverage hedge funds can undertake.  SEC Regulation T was 
enacted pursuant to section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.193  
It imposes a fifty percent margin requirement194 on investors in single 
securities in the cash markets and a significantly lower margin requirement 
 
 190. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of the leverage and thus risk undertaken 
by LTCM. 
 191. Nicola Cetorelli et al., Trends in Financial Market Concentration and Their 
Implications for Market Stability, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Mar. 1, 
2007, at 40–41, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/07v13n1/0703hirt.pdf. 
 192. Id. at 41. 
 193. Federal Reserve Reg. T., 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2008). 
 194. Id. § 220.12.  A margin requirement is simply an amount that an investor must 
deposit in a margin account prior to buying on margin or selling short.  See id. § 220.4(b). 
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for futures transactions.195 However, broker-dealers typically arrange financing 
for hedge funds through foreign affiliates, which are not SEC registered 
and are therefore not subject to SEC jurisdiction.196  By using these foreign 
banking subsidiaries, hedge funds can borrow without any limits and 
accumulate enormous amounts of leverage.197 
The competition for hedge fund business is a significant factor in the 
loosening of credit standards and the ultimate breakdown of market 
discipline.  CRMPG II has noted: 
The competitive pressure to secure relationships with hedge funds, including 
newly established funds, may lead, if not prudently managed, to an erosion of 
the credit standards and protections applied to this new business.  It is essential 
that institutions on both sides of these arrangements fully understand and consider 
 
 195. See id. § 220.12; see also Frank Partnoy, Some Policy Implications of Single-
Stock Futures, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Mar. 2001, at 8 (noting that futures 
transactions normally mandate margin of only a few percent).  In addition, the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) amends section 7 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to provide that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System shall set forth the margin requirement appropriate to the trading of single-stock 
futures.  Id.  Nevertheless, the CFMA also states that the Federal Reserve may delegate 
its authority to the Securities Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, who then would jointly set forth the pertinent margin requirements.  Id. 
 196. Roel C. Campos, SEC Comm’r, Remarks Before the SIA Hedge Funds & 
Alternative Investments Conference, New York, New York (June 14, 2006) 
[hereinafter Campos June 2006 Speech], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2006/spch061406rcc.htm.  Campos stated that “the Commission’s consolidated supervision 
program for certain investment banks now allows the staff to examine not only the 
broker-dealer entities within a group, but also the unregulated affiliates and holding 
company where certain financing transactions with hedge funds are generally booked.”  
Id.  The “consolidated supervision program” referred to is part of a 2004 rule the SEC 
instituted which created a voluntary program to supervise U.S. firms with international, 
unregulated affiliates, on a consolidated basis.  See Alternative Net Capital Requirements 
for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 
34,428, 34,428 (June 8, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.htm.  The firms are referred to as “Consolidated 
Supervised Entities” (CSEs).  Id.  Five of the major U.S. securities firms are currently 
CSEs.  Id. at 34,452; see also A Review of Regulatory Proposals on Basel Capital and 
Commercial Real Estate: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credits of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 114 (2006) 
(testimony of Robert L.D. Colby, Acting Director, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission Division of Market Regulation), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:31549.pdf.  Also see the GAO’s 
January 2008 Report on hedge funds, which states, “[I]n 2004 [the] SEC established a 
program to oversee the large internationally active securities firms on a consolidated 
basis.  These securities firms have significant interaction with hedge funds through affiliates 
previously not overseen by SEC.”  GAO Report, supra note 2, at 5. 
 197. Campos June 2006 Speech, supra note 196.  Hedge funds’ “financing transactions” 
are generally booked through foreign, unregulated affiliates.  Id.  This explains how less 
restrictive margin requirements may apply and explains how hedge funds are able to 
accumulate so much leverage. 
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the terms that govern such credit relationships from a credit, risk and funding/ 
treasury perspective.198 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke has also expressed concern about 
hedge fund counterparty risk management due to the increasing complexity 
of financial products.199  First, Bernanke noted that because hedge funds 
are such profitable customers for dealers, the competition for hedge fund 
business has eroded initial margin levels.200  Second, he noted that because 
the volume of complex transactions is so high, it is questionable whether 
counterparty exposures are being accurately measured.201  Third, he stated 
his concern that not enough stress-testing and aggregate stress-testing is 
being done.202  Finally, Bernanke expressed concern that “the assessment 
of counterparty risks should be better tied to the amount of transparency 
offered by hedge funds.”203  He argued that good risk management should 
bring about hedge funds’ “willingness to provide information on its 
strategies and risk profile.”204 To ensure that credit standards are not 
eroded, it is imperative that these entities improve their risk management.  
Directly regulating them to do so will ensure that such measures are 
consistently taken. 
a.  Prime Brokerage 
The task of indirectly regulating hedge funds through directly 
regulating their creditors is further complicated by the business of prime 
brokerage.  Hedge funds typically execute trades with multiple dealers, 
but then consolidate the clearing and settlement of their trades at one 
firm, known as the “prime broker.”205  Along with settlement services, 
 
 198. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at 63. 
 199. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  Stress testing is a generic term which encompasses several techniques used 
to assess resilience to extreme events.  Stress tests are commonly used to measure the 
stability of a particular system or entity.  Stress tests involve trial above standard operational 
capacity, typically to a breaking point, in order to notice the results.  Stress testing is typically 
referenced with respect to asset portfolios, however, it has recently been applied to entire 
banks, banking systems, and financial systems.  Martin Čihák, Introduction to Applied Stress 
Testing 4–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/59, 2007), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0759.pdf. 
 202. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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the prime broker also provides financing and back office accounting 
services to the hedge fund.206  The number of firms offering prime brokerage 
services has increased, and so too has the scope of the services they 
provide, including foreign exchange and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
trades.207  Experts acknowledge that prime brokers are not necessarily 
aware of all of a hedge fund’s activity.208  Federal Reserve Chairman 
Ben Bernanke highlighted some of the unique challenges prime brokers 
are beginning to pose to the hedge fund mix.  Prime brokers must ensure 
that they have sufficient information and controls to protect against 
counterparty credit risk, must implement controls to monitor and track 
executed transactions to ensure that they meet specified transaction 
terms, and must ensure that firms are fully aware of—and manage—
associated risks.209 
In July 2005, the CRMPG II also noted in a detailed report some of 
the problems associated with the prime brokerage business.  As they did 
with pension funds, CRMPG II noted problems and provided suggestions to 
improve risk management practices, but did not recommend that 
mandatory best risk management practices be imposed by regulation, as 
this Comment does.210 
The CRMPG II called for additional due diligence by market participants 
to “ensure that their counterparties are not mismanaging the incremental 
liquidity provided in these arrangements.”211  Despite liberalization of 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 105, at 66. 
 209. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10. 
 210. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at 67. The CRMPG II Report made 
several suggestions.  CRMPG II noted that if properly executed, prime brokerage activities 
have the potential of reducing overall systemic risk.  Id.  However, they are also subject to 
numerous legal, operational, credit, as well as other risk challenges.  Id.  In order to mitigate 
those challenges, CRMPG II recommended “that significant industry participants 
intensify industry-sponsored efforts to define the important relationships among hedge 
funds and other customers, executing dealers and prime brokers across all product areas 
and business lines.”  Id.  CRMPG II also suggested that all participants in the prime 
brokerage market maintain a comprehensive understanding of the various risk challenges 
incurred in the market, as well as their internal controls, and their various contractual 
relationships.  Id.  CRMPG II suggested prime brokers “ascribe a high priority to actively 
monitoring the credit quality of each of their counterparties, including conducting regular 
due diligence calls and/or meetings.”  Id.  CRMPG II encouraged developing cross-
product prime brokerage and netting agreements that would fully address credit, 
commercial, and risk issues that would “serve to harmonize disparate credit and other 
material credit terms.”  Id.  As derivative prime brokerage products continue to develop, 
CRMPG II recommended that market participants continue to collaborate with industry 
groups to develop standardized terms and agreements.  Id.  Because of the size of prime 
brokerage trading volume, CRMPG II also suggested further automation of systems and 
processes.  Id. 
 211. Id. at 54. 
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initial margin levels and the increasing complexity of margining 
methodologies, CRMPG II believed that financial risk among leveraged 
counterparties was not excessive in 2005.212  Moreover, it claimed that 
even leverage among hedge funds appeared modest.213  But it did temper 
its conclusion by acknowledging that “the lack of transparency inherent 
in more sophisticated products makes a definitive conclusion problematic.”214  
Additionally, it realized that collateral standards based on inadequate 
information or improper risk evaluations clearly set forth the potential 
for leverage to rise to levels that may increase systemic risk.”215  And as 
this Comment has demonstrated above, much has changed since the 
burgeoning economy of 2005, and the potential risks identified by the 
CRMPG II have now begun to be realized.216 
William H. Donaldson, Chairman of the SEC, testified before the 
House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises and noted that firms that provide 
prime brokerage services to hedge funds claim to protect themselves 
through a comprehensive screening process, which involves a review of 
the hedge funds’ business model consistency, credit quality, leverage, as 
well as other areas of risk management.217 However, Donaldson was 
straightforward in acknowledging that “a prime broker is not necessarily 
aware of all of a hedge fund’s activity.”218 Statements such as these 
suggest that standards are too lax.  Free market restraints failed in 1999 
with LTCM, failed again in 2007 with the subprime debacle, and could 
fail in the future unless more aggressive steps are taken.  A prime broker 
should be aware of all of a hedge fund’s activities.  Directly regulating 
these counterparties to ensure that best risk management practices are 
conducted will provide the market discipline that is currently lacking. 
In order to completely understand how hedge funds maintain such 
high levels of leverage, it is necessary to also understand “joint back 
office” arrangements. 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of the recent economic deterioration 
and the role hedge funds have played. 
 217. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 105, at 66. 
 218. Id. 
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b.  Joint Back Office Arrangements 
While some hedge funds register with the SEC as broker-dealers to 
obtain margin benefits available to broker-dealers,219 others use the joint 
back office arrangement.220  A “joint back office” (JBO) is a clearing 
operation that a hedge fund jointly owns with a prime broker for the 
purpose of exceeding the Federal Reserve’s limits on margin borrowing.221  
Understanding at least the fundamentals of the JBO arrangement is 
necessary in order to determine how hedge fund creditors can be 
regulated, both effectively and practically. A JBO avoids the Federal 
Reserve’s Regulation T limits on margin borrowing because, through its 
ownership of part of the clearing operation, a fund can “effectively 
render all transactions with its prime broker as internal transfers—giving 
the prime broker the ability to reduce margin loan requirements substantially, 
under section 220.7(c) of Regulation T.”222  While “most U.S. investors 
can leverage only half of their investments pursuant to Regulation T,” 
hedge funds on the other hand, by establishing a JBO, can borrow “an 
amount equal to many times its equity capital.”223 
The creation of JBO arrangements is authorized by section 220.7(c) of 
Regulation T.  A JBO permits “a creditor [to] effect or finance transactions 
of any of its owners if the creditor is a clearing and servicing broker 
or dealer owned jointly or individually by other creditors.”224 
Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC, remarked on JBOs in a 
speech in 1999: 
[W]hen day-trading firms are organized as LLCs and individual day traders 
contribute to the firm’s capital, the day traders are permitted to trade using the 
firm’s capital.  These LLC firms typically participate in [JBO] arrangements, 
which allow them to enhance their borrowing power. JBO arrangements have 
become popular because they allow day-trading firms to receive preferential 
margin treatment from their clearing firms.  Specifically, a day-trading firm that 
 
 219. CHI. BD. OPTIONS EXCH., CBOE INVESTOR SERIES—PAPER NO. 5, HEDGE 
FUNDS & LISTED OPTIONS: PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 7 n.20 (2001), 
available at http://www.cboe.com/Institutional/pdf/hedgefundwhitepaper_11-2001.pdf; 
see also Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation T margin rules at 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.7, 
220.12 (2008) (setting forth margin requirements and benefits). 
 220. For a detailed summary of the JBO general rules, see Trader Status.com, 
F.A.Q. 6.21, http://www.traderstatus.com/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 221. Hedge Fund Alert, Glossary: Joint Back Office, http://www.hfalert.com/ 
NewPages/Index.cfm?Article_ID=61250 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Day Trading: An Overview: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 67 (1999) 
[hereinafter Testimony of Levitt] (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:61159.pdf; see also 12 C.F.R. 
§ 220.7(c) (2008). 
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participates in a JBO arrangement can receive credit from its JBO clearing firm 
on “good faith” terms.  As a result, the customer margin requirements found in 
Regulation T and SRO rules do not limit the extension of credit to a JBO 
participant.  Rather, credit can be extended for up to 100 percent of the purchase 
price of the securities. . . . Because of the borrowing power permitted by JBO 
arrangements, the leverage of day-trading firms organized as LLCs is limited 
only by the net capital rule.  This essentially allows firms to leverage their 
position 6 to 1, rather than the 2 to 1 leverage allowed day traders under SROs’ 
rules.225 
A commonly recognized trade-off for the leverage JBOs provide hedge 
funds is oversight because the hedge funds are able to take on substantial 
credit risk.226 
The President’s Working Group (PWG), a group consisting of the 
Secretary of the Treasury as well as the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve, 
the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which was 
established primarily to recommend solutions to enhance the integrity of 
financial markets,227 has recognized some of the concerns raised by 
hedge funds, and has called for better “counterparty risk management.”228  
However, its recommendations fall short of what is needed to ensure risk 
management is in place.  Banks and other counterparties that are eager 
for hedge fund business have an incentive to lower their standards.  They 
have failed and may continue to fail to request the necessary disclosures 
and due diligence materials.  Recommending best practices is not enough— 
what is needed is mandatory counterparty risk management, to ensure all 
the information is available prior to a given transaction. 
 
 225. Testimony of Levitt, supra note 224, at 67. 
 226. Garry Weiss, A Street Scandal That May Not Die, BUS. WK., Aug. 9, 1999, 
at 77. 
 227. Exec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559–60 (1989). 
 228. See Agreement, supra note 128, at 3–4. 
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2.  An International Solution 
As the above discussion demonstrates, regulating hedge fund creditors 
is far more complex than regulating hedge fund investors. United States 
corporate pension funds are inescapably regulated by ERISA. In contrast, 
Wall Street trading firms and investment banks carefully structure their 
hedge fund financing transactions to evade SEC jurisdiction. Through 
the use of foreign affiliates, they are able to arrange financing for hedge 
funds without being subject to the margin requirements of Regulation T.  
Therefore, international standards are needed in order to uniformly reach 
hedge fund creditors.229 
It has been noted that policymakers must embrace global regulation of 
hedge funds similar to the increasingly global regulation of banking.230  
One such forum to undertake this task could be the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). BIS is “an international organization which fosters 
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank 
for central banks.”231  BIS acts as “a forum to promote discussion and 
policy analysis among central banks and within the international 
financial community,” as well as an institute of “economic and monetary 
research,” a “prime counterparty for central banks in their financial 
 
 229. It should be noted that the GAO January 2008 Report on hedge funds mentioned a 
2006 effort to assess risk management policies with hedge funds through prime brokers, 
on an international level.  The Report stated: 
In late 2006, FRBNY, SEC, OCC, FSA, and bank regulators of Germany and 
Switzerland—collectively, the “multilateral effort”—jointly conducted a 
review of the largest commercial and investment banks that transacted business 
with hedge funds as counterparties and creditors.  The agencies met with nine 
major U.S. and European bank and securities firms to discuss risk management 
policies and procedures related to interactions with hedge funds through prime 
brokerage, direct lending, and over-the-counter derivative transactions.  According 
to one U.S. regulator, the reviewers found that the current and potential credit 
exposures of these banks to hedge funds were small relative to the banks’ 
capital because of their extensive use of collateral agreements.  However, the 
reviewers identified a number of issues related to the management of 
exposures to hedge funds and the measurement of potential exposures in 
adverse market conditions.  The regulators participating in this effort have 
been addressing these issues by gathering additional data or information to 
help regulators learn more about the condition and quality of the firms’ risk 
management practices.  The regulators are conducting an ongoing follow-up 
review, which entails more detailed work by the principal regulator of each 
firm. 
GAO Report, supra note 2, at 36–37.  Although this is a good sign, it is not enough.  
More aggressive steps should be instituted to establish international standards for banks’ 
dealings with hedge funds, such as those proposed in this Comment. 
 230. Housing & Hedge Funds, supra note 67. 
 231. Bank for International Settlements, About BIS, http://www.bis.org/about/ 
faq.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
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transactions,” and an agent or trustee with respect to international 
financial operations.232 
In its capacity as a forum to promote discussion and policy among 
central banks, this Comment recommends that BIS meet with all fifty-
five of the member central banks to establish uniform international 
standards for banks worldwide in extending credit to hedge funds.233  At 
a minimum, the member banks should mandate that all entities that 
engage in hedge fund financing should only engage in such financing if 
the hedge funds provide them with audited financials, follow SEC or 
other accepted rules in calculating the value of their assets, and disclose 
their trading strategies in confidence.234 
C.  Hedge Fund Registration with the SEC 
In the context of requiring pension funds or creditor counterparties to 
only deal with registered hedge funds, it is important to examine how 
hedge funds would register with the SEC and what disclosures such 
registration would entail.  As a result of the Supreme Court decision in 
Goldstein v. SEC, it is implausible to have hedge funds register as 
investment advisers.235  Further, because hedge funds are very different 
from investment companies such as mutual funds, having them register 
as investment companies would also be implausible. 
Therefore, because the current securities laws afford no practical way 
of reaching hedge funds, Congress would have to enact new legislation.  
This legislation should provide that hedge funds should register with the 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Members are the central banks or monetary authorities of: Algeria, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the European Central 
Bank.  Bank for International Settlements, Organisation and Governance, http://www. 
bis.org/about/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 234. If this approach through the BIS is unsuccessful or infeasible, another way to 
internationally regulate hedge fund creditors would be through the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets (PWG).  PWG could establish a joint regulatory task force, 
with an investor component, charged with garnering international cooperation in mandating 
uniform standards in extending credit to hedge funds. 
 235. See supra Part I.B.2.a for an overview of the Goldstein case, which held the 
SEC’s rule to be an instance of arbitrary rulemaking. 
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SEC as hedge funds, and the legislation should incorporate the commonly 
accepted definitions and standards for designating a fund as a hedge 
fund.  While this registration would be voluntary as opposed to mandatory, 
pressure from pension funds and creditors would provide an indirect 
incentive for hedge funds to register and disclose audited financials, 
follow SEC rules in calculating the value of their assets, and disclose 
their trading strategies in confidence.  Further, this legislation should not 
focus on prescribing rules of conduct or attempts to regulate strategies or 
leverage.  It should simply provide an avenue for disclosure—to ensure 
that market participants are fully informed so that they can exercise 
prudent levels of risk management. The CRMPG II noted in 2005 that 
“[h]edge funds’ ability to generate credit-relevant information (e.g., VaR 
and stress-tested exposures) has generally improved.”236 Therefore, 
providing such information should not be an overwhelming burden. 
D.  Would This Proposal Drive Hedge Funds Out of the Country? 
If U.S. corporate pension funds are prohibited by ERISA from 
investing in hedge funds that are not registered with the SEC, and so 
disclose minimal information to improve pension fund due diligence 
efforts and minimize systemic risk, the question arises whether this will 
be a sufficient disincentive to drive hedge funds out of the country.  It is 
unlikely that hedge funds would be driven abroad by such indirect 
regulation given the reality that most pension money is located in the 
United States.237  In fact, it is plausible that other countries will follow 
the United States’ lead and improve their counterparty risk management 
as well.  Further, to the extent that hedge funds do seek capital abroad 
from less conservative investors, the U.S. economy will be in a better 
position.  The global economy cannot afford another market crisis such 
as LTCM or the subprime mortgage collapse.  It has become clear that 
the only way to prevent such a crisis is to improve market discipline and 
raise the standards of risk management. 
 
 236. Report of CRMPG II, supra note 74, at 45. 
 237. See Figure 1, infra p. 1035. 
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Source: Pensions & Investments/Watson Wyatt Global 300 survey 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke recognized, systemic risk 
can never be entirely eliminated.238 Attempting to do so would “likely 
stifle innovation without achieving the intended goal.”239 He stated that 
“authorities should (and will) try to ensure that the lapses in risk 
management of 1998 do not happen again.”240  Bernanke also noted: 
Authorities’ primary task is to guard against a return of the weak market 
discipline that left major market participants overly vulnerable to market shocks.  
Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course for 
addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.  This public policy approach 
does not entail the moral hazard concerns created by authorities’ monitoring of 
positions using a private database.  Rather, a focus on counterparty risk management 
 
 238. Bernanke May 2006 Speech, supra note 10. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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places the responsibility for monitoring risk squarely on the private market 
participants with the best incentives and capacity to do so.241 
Direct regulation is unlikely and infeasible; it has been attempted and 
failed, and it runs the risk of moving hedge funds outside of the United 
States’ regulatory jurisdiction.  Groups such as the PWG recommend 
focusing on indirect regulation in order to preserve some of the benefits 
hedge funds provide.  Placing the regulatory focus on market participants 
will limit systemic risk because best risk management practices will now 
be mandatory.  This will minimize agency costs and ensure that adequate 
market discipline exists. 
It is still unclear how much money major pension funds have lost due 
to their exposure to hedge funds.  Several hedge funds have started to 
collapse because of their bets on CDOs, and it is likely that only the tip 
of the iceberg has been exposed.  Indirect hedge fund regulation should 
be implemented soon so that losses are minimized, and so that those 
losses are absorbed by the appropriate parties—those who are fully 
informed, understand the risk of their investment, and based on that 
understanding, are able to withstand any potential losses. 
 
 
 241. Id. 
